G20: Trump and the Interest in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan

Luis Augusto Medeiros Rutledge

The invitation extended by U.S. President Donald Trump to the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to attend the 2026 G20 carries a well-crafted geopolitical rationale.

The rise of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the international stage reflects a central aspiration for Central Asia to be more than merely a chess piece in the game of great powers—particularly as both countries present themselves as a “bridge” between Russia and the West, and as an energy and logistics hub linking Europe and Asia.

Recently, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have succeeded in capturing the attention of Washington and major U.S. corporations, signing contracts and securing investments worth billions of dollars. This signals a strategic shift that balances Western influence with longstanding historical ties to Moscow.

Over recent decades, Central Asia’s energy architecture has undergone profound changes with decisive impacts on the region’s geopolitical and economic structure. Kazakhstan, in particular, possesses energy assets, fiscal dependence, and geopolitical relevance that motivated Trump’s invitation to the next G20 gathering.

Kazakhstan occupies a central position on the global energy chessboard. The country holds the world’s 6th largest endowment of natural resources, with proven oil reserves of 3.9 billion tonnes (12th globally) and estimated natural gas reserves of 2.7 trillion cubic meters (14th globally). This resource base underpins not only domestic economic growth but also its regional and intercontinental geopolitical projection.

In recent years, oil production reached 85.9 million tonnes, of which only 23% was consumed domestically, while gas production totaled 54.2 billion cubic meters, with 61% destined for the domestic market. Over the past 30 years, oil production has increased 3.5 times, consolidating the country as a structural exporter: more than 80% of the oil produced is exported, with the remainder directed to domestic refining.

This dependence is directly reflected in the country’s political economy. Oil accounts for more than 50% of total exports, while the oil and gas sector contributes between 30% and 50% of republican budget revenues, making fiscal policy highly sensitive to international price cycles and production discipline. From a capital perspective, around 33% of the average gross inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) over the past decade has been concentrated in the oil and gas sector, reinforcing the centrality of upstream activities in the national development strategy.

In the geopolitical context, Trump seeks to place a strategic constraint on Russia. Kazakhstan’s relevance goes beyond economics. Its underground resources are assuming growing geopolitical weight amid the reconfiguration of global energy flows, especially following sanctions against Russia. The country is emerging as a strategic alternative supplier for both the European Union and China, both under pressure from energy security imperatives.

In this regard, non-Russian export routes enhance Kazakhstan’s strategic value. Oil supplies to Germany via Poland through the Druzhba pipeline, as well as shipments through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to Turkey and Mediterranean markets, reduce Europe’s dependence on Moscow and strengthen Astana’s negotiating position. At the same time, this diversification exposes the country to indirect geopolitical risks, including tensions in the Caucasus, logistical bottlenecks, and diplomatic pressure from competing powers.

Uzbekistan, for its part, has been gaining increasing prominence on the West’s energy and geopolitical radar, driven by its significant natural gas reserves, strategic geographic position in Central Asia, and a gradual process of economic opening and structural reforms. Although less internationally exposed than Kazakhstan, the country represents a complementary energy asset in a global scenario marked by the search for supplier diversification and reduced dependence on Russian sources.

For the West, interest in Uzbekistan is not limited to gas. The country also holds strategic uranium reserves—ranking among the world’s top five producers—as well as copper, gold, and critical minerals essential to the energy transition. This combination positions Uzbekistan as a potentially relevant supplier for low-carbon value chains, especially in a context of geoeconomic reconfiguration and competition for strategic inputs.

The intensification of dialogue with the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom reflects this logic. Cooperation initiatives focused on energy, mining, infrastructure, and governance have advanced, with the West seeking to reduce political risks, improve regulatory standards, and create conditions for greater participation by international companies in the energy upstream and midstream.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan also have the potential to develop renewable energy sources such as solar and wind. Energy development is expected to accelerate by 2030 as renewable technologies become more accessible and competitive. Given their geographic location and climatic conditions, the most promising renewable sources are small hydropower plants, solar, and wind energy.

Global energy geopolitics is changing rapidly following the Russia–Ukraine crisis. While the Western world has responded cohesively to Russian aggression through sanctions, it has also accelerated its influence in the region by holding summit meetings with Asia—particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The holding of EU–Central Asia and Germany–Central Asia summits will contribute to Kazakhstan’s development, given its geostrategic and geopolitical importance in Western efforts to find alternatives to Russia in the context of the Russia–Ukraine crisis, whether in terms of energy or transit routes that bypass Russia. This indicates that its value is increasing. As the West becomes more active in Central Asia, summits involving China, India, and Russia with the region stand out, creating a competitive environment.

This balance between opportunity and vulnerability turns these countries into strategic assets for institutional investors, energy policymakers, and geopolitical actors—especially in a scenario of fragmented global energy markets and increasing securitization of supply chains.

Luis Augusto Medeiros Rutledge is a Petroleum Engineer and Energy Geopolitics Analyst. He holds an Executive MBA in Oil and Gas Economics from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and a postgraduate degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from IBMEC. He works as a researcher at UFRJ, is a Consulting Member of the Observatory of the Islamic World of Portugal, a consultant for the Foreign Trade Studies Center Foundation (FUNCEX), a columnist for the website Mente Mundo Relações Internacionais, and the author of numerous published articles on the energy sector.