North winds blowing in Latin America: the 2026 Brazilian election on the regional stage
Flávia Abud Luz
On May 26, 2026, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, then PL's pre-candidate for the presidency in Brazil, was at the White House. The trip was part of the pre-campaign that already used the theme of bilateral relations between the United States and Brazil as a flag, and it was precisely in such a context that a photographic record of Flávio and his brother Eduardo Bolsonaro, alongside President Donald Trump, was made. The image, soon after, would gain social networks and news in the press, indicating, at the same time, two movements: the ideological rapprochement between the then pre-candidate Flávio and Trump and, on the other hand, a concern of foreign policy analysts regarding the existence of possible interference in the electoral election.
The main objective of this article is to analyze, even if briefly, the Brazilian political conjuncture, seeking to discuss to what extent the 2026 Brazilian presidential election expresses a regional diffusion of the right, that is, a political-ideological tendency conditioned by multiple actors and by a family-dynastic logic that would have as its greatest expression a kind of consolidation of an even greater dispute in the Latin American region: the relentless attempt of the US to contain the fall of its empire and at the same time isolate China's action in the region.
Monroe Doctrine, interventions and the reconfiguration of power in the twenty-first century
The architecture of power in Latin America is going through one of its most turbulent and decisive periods since the end of the Cold War. For decades, the Monroe Doctrine, the central vector of U.S. exceptionalism and formalized in 1823, influenced the formulation of U.S. foreign policy for the region. Although in its initial context this Doctrine aimed to prevent the actions of Spain and other European powers in the Western Hemisphere, over time it was revisited, perhaps having its peak from the actions of President Theodore Roosevelt, who under the policy of the "Big Stick" began to use the pretext of "protecting the security of America" (as a continent) to carry out political and military interventions in Latin American and Caribbean countries.
The doctrine developed a double moral standard of action that, while wanting to "prevent" the projection of power by European countries in the region, did not hesitate to transform it into a kind of geopolitical chessboard of its own. The apex of such double morality can be observed, for example, between 1960 and 1980, when the rhetoric of democratic values that guided American exceptionalism, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, were replaced by a logic that aimed to prioritize the containment of communism, under the aegis of the National Security Doctrine (NSD).
The twenty-first century, in turn, brought a new challenge to Washington's hegemony: the rise of a multipolar world, driven by China's massive economic presence and the consolidation of blocs such as the BRICS (Stuenkel, 2018). To contain the loss of influence and neutralize the rise of progressive and nationalist governments that seek regional autonomy, the United States has adapted its tactics. Today, we can observe the construction of a new political strand in the American continent — often dubbed in the media as the "orange wave" in reference to ultraliberal and libertarian movements — an extreme right with a veneer of digital populism, conservative agendas in customs, and automatic alignment with Euro-Atlantic geopolitical interests.
The new form of interference is sophisticated, pervasive, and often operates in the gray zones of democracy. It manifests itself through the funding of foundations, the training of leaders by think tanks, the export of data manipulation technologies, and reverse soft power that aims to destabilize institutions and pave the way for the radical right.
The turning point here is evident: the strategy of action has migrated to the field of metapolitics, information warfare, and institutional co-optation, much more complex elements whose influence is already observed in the region, I explain. At the center of this mechanism of modulation of political perceptions are transnational organizations of political development. The Atlas Network, for example, operates as a vast umbrella that distributes millions of dollars annually to hundreds of ultraliberal and conservative institutes spread across Latin America (Borges & Pereira, 2022).
These local institutions act as incubators of narratives, translating the American playbooks of economic deregulation and "culture war" into the reality of each country. At the same time, events such as the CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference)[1] function as stages to unify tactics, create a common visual and discursive identity, and connect local activists directly to political strategists in Washington.
The digitization of public debate has offered the perfect opportunity for the operation of this new tactic, as US-based political marketing consultancies, using vast databases drawn from digital platforms, have brought advanced microtargeting techniques to the Global South (Da Empoli, 2019). The mass firing of disinformation, voter targeting based on psychological profiling, and algorithmic radicalization have replaced the traditional pamphlets and rallies used by political parties in the region. The destabilization of the political-social order and the erosion of trust in democratic institutions through informational saturation, combined with the use of lawfare (in this context, the instrumentalization of the justice system to persecute and disqualify political leaders not aligned with Washington) has become the order of the day; a strategy used in different countries in the region to mobilize sympathy and action in the face of elections.
The three-pronged dynamics of the regional chessboard
When we look at the Latin American chessboard, a first element stands out: the implementation of the U.S. strategy has adapted to the institutional particularities of each country, always seeking the same objective of neutralizing sovereign national projects and ensuring control of strategic resources, especially critical materials and oil. Between 2023 and 2026, three countries reached the right by different paths.
Argentina elected Javier Milei, who presented himself as a "libertarian outsider" and throughout his term carried out a series of actions that put a significant portion of the country below the poverty line. Colombia put an end to the first cycle of leftist government in its republican history (led by Gustavo Petro) and elected Abelardo de la Espriella, a millionaire former lawyer, who represented a harsh response to the policies of the previous government. Peru, on the other hand, handed over the presidency to Keiko Fujimori, after three consecutive defeats in second rounds.
In 2023, Javier Milei's victory represented the apex of the "orange wave" in the region, as his victory was immediately celebrated by conservative networks in the US and liberal think tanks funded by the Atlas Network (Borges & Pereira, 2022). The alignment of the current Argentine government with Washington can be observed in actions such as: the proposition of dollarization of the economy, the rejection of joining the BRICS, the opening of the country to financialization and the extraction of resources such as lithium, driving away Asian competitors.
Trump said, on the eve of the October 2025 legislative elections, that economic aid depended on the victory of Milei's group, in a package that included a $20 billion swap[2]. In the 2025 parliamentary elections, Milei's party, Liberty Advances, won seats in the House and Senate of the national Senate[3], a fact that was observed as a kind of "endorsement" of Milei's government, which was in its second year in office. Here it should be noted that such an action the link between external support and electoral result was declared by the state actor himself.
In Colombia, the election of Abelardo De la Espriella represented an important change from the government of his predecessor Gustavo Petro, as the deep ties between the Colombian intelligence apparatus, local military elites, and U.S. agencies serve as a constant counterweight, hindering the progressive reforms previously advocated by the Petro government. In October 2026, just over two months after his inauguration, De la Espriella has faced a wave of popular demonstrations[4] that have led to a worrisome measure from a democratic point of view: the signing of Decree 1525 of 2026, which imposed rules for holding demonstrations and changed the protocols of police conduct with regard to the ability to coerce such demonstrations by seeking to contain alleged acts of violence and vandalism by the population.
Unlike the environmental policy of the previous government, De la Espriella bets on the reduction of the state and the incentive to oil, which favors the contribution of US companies and strengthens the free market trade agenda between the two countries.
Keiko Fujimori's victory in her fourth attempt to reach the presidency of Peru not only represents the triumph of a persistent family political project, but consolidates the Andean region's transition towards a conservative agenda focused on security and alignment with Washington.
Brazil as the centerpiece of the turn to the right?
The 2018 cycle marked the rise of a new configuration of the right in Brazil, catalyzed by a deep crisis of representation, the erosion of traditional parties in the wake of corruption investigations, and a sharp economic decline. In this context, anti-system rhetoric found fertile ground, temporarily uniting economic liberals, religious conservatives, military sectors, and voters disillusioned with conventional politics. That year's executive victory established the pillars of a movement focused on culture war, armamentism, and the revaluation of moral agendas.
In 2022, the elections brought a mixed result to the far right, since in the scope of the executive power there was the return of the Workers' Party (PT), but the far right and the conservative right demonstrated structural strength by electing the largest benches in the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, in addition to winning the governments of economically strategic states in the Southeast and South.
The rise of the far right in the country from the second half of the 2010s onwards was not a purely organic or isolated phenomenon, but strongly catalyzed by the importation of political methodologies tested in the United States during the phenomenon of Trumpism, operating through a new dynamic of digital populism (Cesarino, 2022).
Recent Brazilian electoral campaigns have seen the adoption of a playbook identical to that of strategists such as Steve Bannon: the systematic attack on the traditional press, the mobilization of evangelical bases through moral panic, the promise of a free-market shock, and, crucially, the fabrication of unfounded suspicions against the electoral system (Da Empoli, 2019; Cesarino, 2022). The symbiosis became evident in the constant exchange of visits between Brazilian right-wing leaders and lobbyists in Washington, as well as in the holding of successive editions of CPAC in Brazil.
The tacit and, at times, explicit support of sectors of U.S. politics for these leaders serves a clear purpose: to ensure that South America's largest economy remains internally fractured and away from a haughty and active foreign policy. In other words, a polarized Brazil, focused on culture wars and led by governments that adopt a posture of diplomatic submission, is a Brazil incapable of leading regional integration. The attack on the headquarters of the Three Powers on January 8, 2023 was the practical corollary of this ideological import, demonstrating the strength of disinformation as a tool for institutional rupture.
Between 2022 and 2026 we observed a rearrangement of forces: judicial decisions that removed central figures from the electoral process, in this case the ineligibility of leaders who headed the original movement, forced the right into a process of succession and pulverization that, instead of weakening the conservative camp, generated a laboratory of "new leaderships", I explain. Governors with a more technocratic and administrative profile began to absorb the electoral spoils of the movement, trying to balance the pragmatism of state management with nods to the more radical ideological base. Simultaneously, parliamentarians and politicians with a strong digital presence assumed the role of the opposition's frontline in Congress, ensuring the constant mobilization of the grassroots through agendas aimed at public security and the limitation of reproductive and minority rights.
Decentralization reduced the dependence on a single charismatic leader and the movement understood that the control of the legislative budget and regimental tools offers a power of veto and formulation of public policies many times greater than that of the Executive itself. Thus, the extreme right that presents itself to the polls in 2026 is no longer an insurgency against institutions, but a force that operates the institutional gears to normalize and advance its ideological agenda and specific interests, even if this fact requires the expansion of ideological alignment with external forces, such as the US.
2026 elections and their resonances so far
Instead of depending on a single vector of social dissatisfaction, the extreme right structured a multifaceted platform capable of unifying different demographic and economic strata. This mobilization base operated through the articulation of three fundamental axes, namely: a) the cultural war in defense of traditional values, b) the pragmatic alignment with free market principles, and c) the adoption of a punitive grammar aimed at public security.
The culture war in defense of "traditional values" continues to exploit the narrative that traditional institutions (mainly the family and the Christian religion) are under threat from "progressive agendas" structured around human rights, gender debates, and environmental agendas. By framing the political debate as a moral or existential dispute, the leaders of the extreme right have managed to engage significant portions of the electorate, especially evangelical and Catholic segments considered to be more conservative. In addition to mobilizing the electorate, this "culture war" has materialized in bills in the National Congress that aim to restrict reproductive rights, change educational guidelines, and limit the recognition of gender identities, keeping the base of supporters in a state of permanent mobilization.
If the moral agenda guarantees popular mobilization, the alliance with economic liberalism ensures support, financing, and legitimacy before the productive and financial elites: the far right has forged a pragmatic pact with the market by embracing agendas of deregulation, privatization, relaxation of labor and environmental laws, and reduction of the tax burden. In 2026, this symbiosis is particularly visible in the strategic alliance with agribusiness and with sectors of the business community in different regions of the country, since for these groups support for radical conservatism is often justified not necessarily by total adherence to the agenda of customs, but by the guarantee of a business environment with less state interference and frontal opposition to interventionist policies associated with the left.
The public security agenda has become one of the most powerful vectors of electoral attraction of the right. Led by highlights of the rates of urban violence and chronic insecurity observed especially in large urban centers, the punitive discourse elaborated by the movement is based on the premise of restoring order through criminal hardening, unrestricted support for the actions of security forces (including the relaxation of the use of lethal force) and the defense of civilian weapons as a right to self-defense. Leaders associated with the military and civil police have been consolidated, since the previous electoral cycle, as prominent political figures under the rhetoric of "order" that operates with a logic of zero tolerance, framing human rights as obstacles to police efficiency and offering direct and immediate responses to the concerns of a population vulnerable to crime.
We have reached the second round of the 2026 Brazilian presidential election amid the polarization of political forces in the national context and discussions about external interference (focused on the action of the Trump government and the actions of big techs), as well as Brazilian sovereignty and the exploitation of critical minerals.
The debate on critical minerals and the energy transition assumed a central role in the 2026 Brazilian presidential elections, being directly linked to the theme of national sovereignty. Critical and strategic minerals are considered essential for the economy, food security, military defense, and the global energy transition; and thus the management of these resources is seen as a vector of autonomy and international projection for the country.
While candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is committed to ensuring that mineral and energy wealth contributes to national sovereignty and energy transition; the far-right candidate, Flávio Bolsonaro, focuses his strategy on accelerating mineral exploration, unlocking mining rights, and accelerating environmental licensing.
Lula defends keeping Brazil open to agreements with various global partners (including China, India, the European Union) and his plan does not stipulate the flexibility of licensing for mining, but requires that large exploration agreements contemplate the transfer of technology, the attraction of investments and the creation of local research centers. Here is evident the concern to ensure that access to such a natural resource must ensure sovereignty and protect the country from common agreements in neoliberal governments in which natural resources are usually exploited without there being a direct benefit for the countries that own them. The recent approval of the National Policy on Critical, Strategic Minerals and Rare Earths[5] (Law 15,506, of 2026), still in September 2026, points to the concern regarding the guarantee that resources from Brazilian lands, especially critical minerals, are managed by national initiatives, avoiding the speculative action of foreign capital.
Considerations: the Brazilian democratic crossroads and the regional question
The 2026 electoral cycle crystallizes the transition of the far right from a rhetorical insurgency movement to a structural force in institutional power struggles in Brazil. The current elections demonstrate that the national political chessboard is dictated not only by presidential polarization, but by complex negotiations at the legislative and state levels. In this scenario, the behavior of the center parties and the containment strategies of the progressive camp reveal the challenges of operating in an environment of hyperpolarization and party fragmentation.
The realization that algorithms designed in Silicon Valley have the power to elect presidents in the Global South has led to a renewed effort in discussions for platform regulation (Zanatta, 2023). The legal and legislative confrontation against Big Techs — aimed at holding them accountable for the dissemination of coordinated disinformation campaigns — is seen not only as a public health agenda, but as a central defense of national sovereignty, preventing regional policy from being dictated by the corporate rules of the North (Cesarino, 2022; Zanatta, 2023).
The rise of the so-called "orange wave" is not a simple coincidence of domestic factors that led the populations of the countries of the region to an electoral change, but rather the symptom of a geopolitical reengineering where the United States replaced the old direct military interventions with a highly sophisticated digital and institutional soft power.
Brazil's democratic destiny will depend on its ability to build robust regional integration and effective digital sovereignty (Zanatta, 2023), preventing the continent from being relegated to the old condition of the backyard of imperial disputes.
Referências Bibliográficas
BORGES, Camila; PEREIRA, Carlos. A atuação da Atlas Network na América Latina e o financiamento de think tanks ultraliberais. Revista de Estudos Internacionais e Geopolítica, v. 12, n. 2, 2022.
CESARINO, Letícia. O mundo do avesso: Verdade e política na era digital. São Paulo: Ubu Editora, 2022.
DA EMPOLI, Giuliano. Os Engenheiros do Caos: Como as fake news, as teorias da conspiração e os algoritmos estão sendo utilizados para disseminar ódio, medo e influenciar eleições. São Paulo: Vestígio, 2019.
STUENKEL, Oliver. O Mundo Pós-Ocidental: Como as potências emergentes estão reordenando o sistema global. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2018.
Flávia Abud Luz
Professor of International Relations. PhD in Human and Social Sciences from UFABC. Master in Religious Sciences from Mackenzie Presbyterian University, Specialization in Politics and International Relations from FESPSP and Bachelor in International Relations from FAAP. Areas of interest: Postcolonial Theories, Gender Social Relations, Human Rights and Women's Movements, International Conflicts, Politics and Religion, especially topics related to the Middle East (Levant and Persian Gulf sub-areas); Lebanese domestic politics. Author of the books "Islamic Feminism, Social Movements and the Reconstruction of Women's Rights in Morocco (Editora Appris, 2025)" and "The appropriation of the concepts of martyrdom and jihad by Hezbollah and the issue of violence as resistance (Editora Appris, 2020)". She is currently developing research on the relations between gender, religion and International Relations. Member of the research groups Ylê-Educare: Education and Ethnic-Racial Issues (PPGE/Uninove); Gina - Research Group on Gender, Race and Intersectionalities; Right to Education, Human Rights and Public Policies (UNIAN/SP); Study and Research Group on Movements, Intersectionality and Educational Policies in Latin America - GEMINAL (Univas/MG). It is affiliated with the Brazilian Association of International Relations (ABRI).
[1] https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/entenda-o-que-e-o-cpac-evento-que-reune-milei-e-bolsonaro-em-sc/
[2] https://www.poder360.com.br/poder-internacional/trump-diz-que-ajuda-a-argentina-depende-da-vitoria-de-milei
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