The Rise of the Far Right and the Erosion of Democracy

Luis Augusto Medeiros Rutledge

The international political landscape is undergoing a regression that can no longer be interpreted simply as an electoral swing between left and right. Across different democracies, nationalist, populist and, in most cases, far-right movements are gaining strength, transforming social dissatisfaction, economic insecurity, immigration, national identity and distrust in institutions into a powerful electoral force.

It is important to establish a fundamental distinction from the outset. Conservatism, economic liberalism, democratic right-wing politics, nationalism, radical populism and the far right are not equivalent concepts. A healthy democracy presupposes alternation in power and legitimately accommodates governments of the right, center or left. The problem begins when electoral competition is accompanied by the rejection of democratic rules, the systematic delegitimization of institutions, political intolerance, attacks on the press, the transformation of minorities into internal enemies, or attempts to concentrate power. It is precisely at this point that the contemporary phenomenon deserves attention.

The far-right wave is already beginning to wash over the European Union. Recent political turbulence in Germany represents merely one stage in a much broader struggle over the future of European liberal democracy. In the coming electoral cycles, the continent's central countries will test the ability of nationalist and populist forces to transform growing electoral support into permanent political power.

Perhaps the most important aspect is not simply how many governments these forces will manage to capture. It is the fact that parties positioned at the extremes can alter the very center of gravity of political debate, pushing traditional parties to incorporate issues, language and proposals that were previously confined to the margins of the political system.

An analysis of the European continent requires attention to several variables. Europeans are simultaneously facing economic, demographic, migratory, military and identity-related challenges.

The seemingly endless war in Ukraine, European Union sanctions against Russia, rising costs and the energy crisis, immigration, the stagnation of the German economy and an increasingly complex relationship with the United States are fueling a sense of insecurity.

In Germany, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has become one of the clearest expressions of this transformation. The phenomenon is particularly symbolic because it is taking place precisely in the country whose postwar political architecture was built around mechanisms designed to prevent the return of the extremism that destroyed the Weimar Republic. For now, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland and other countries are showing less timid manifestations of this political phenomenon, but they are no less concerning.

In France, the growth of the National Rally has profoundly altered the structure of political competition. In Italy, the government of Giorgia Meloni demonstrates another possibility: movements originating in the radical right can reach government and, once institutionalized, combine moderation in certain areas with a harder line in others.

The problem does not necessarily begin with a coup. There is a mistaken assumption that democracies disappear through military intervention, the immediate closure of parliament and the abrupt suspension of the Constitution. Contemporary history shows a more complex reality.

Recent processes of democratic backsliding have been driven, to a significant extent, by democratically elected governments that exploit legal and constitutional vulnerabilities to weaken checks on the executive and reduce the conditions for genuinely free political competition.

Therefore, democratic erosion begins at the ballot box. This does not mean that voting for conservative parties is equivalent to voting against democracy. Such a conclusion would be mistaken and politically counterproductive. It simply means that electoral legitimacy cannot be used as an argument to justify any exercise of power.

We can analyze democratic backsliding from several perspectives. Significant segments of Western societies have experienced decades marked by globalization, the deindustrialization of certain regions, rising housing costs, the precariousness of parts of the labor market, accelerated technological transformation and a growing perception of distance between citizens and political elites. In addition, increasing immigration has added a cultural dimension to the economic problem.

For certain social groups, particularly those who perceive a loss of economic or cultural status, demographic transformation may be interpreted not merely as social change, but as a threat to national identity. Far-right movements have recognized this discontent and taken advantage of it to position themselves as the voices of the socially dissatisfied.

As if this were not enough, the digital revolution has become a direct channel for extremist conservatives. Social media has reduced the mediation historically exercised by newspapers, political parties, universities and other institutions. This has democratized communication, but it has also created ecosystems capable of rewarding outrage, fear, simplification and conspiracy theories. The political opponent then ceases to be someone who holds a different interpretation of society. He or she becomes an enemy.

The inevitable question is whether we are witnessing a repetition of the Europe of the 1930s and 1940s. The comparison must be made with extreme caution. Contemporary Europe is not the Europe of 1933. The economic, military, institutional and international conditions are profoundly different. The European Union, NATO, constitutional courts, organized civil societies and decades of democratic consolidation have created barriers that were either nonexistent or much weaker during that period.

Nevertheless, it would not be incorrect to identify references to Nazism or historical fascism in contemporary far-right movements. Nazism and fascism demonstrated something that remains valid: democratic institutions can be used by movements that, after attaining positions of power, seek to weaken the mechanisms that constrain that very power.

Adolf Hitler did not simply seize power through an election that granted him an absolute majority; his rise resulted from a much more complex combination of electoral success, institutional crisis, political violence, decisions by conservative elites and the subsequent rapid destruction of democratic institutions.

In Italy, Mussolini likewise combined political mobilization, violence and subsequent authoritarian institutionalization.

Portugal followed a different historical trajectory, and the Estado Novo cannot be reduced to the idea of a dictatorship simply produced through popular voting.

Therefore, the most accurate historical lesson is not that dictatorships begin with the vote. It is deeper: voting, by itself, does not immunize a society against authoritarianism.

It is precisely for this reason that the Brazilian electoral result of October 2026 needs to be analyzed with serenity and depth. The first round held on October 4 demonstrated the very significant strength of the far-right political camp.

It would be intellectually insufficient to explain this phenomenon simply by claiming that almost half of the Brazilian electorate has become extremist. The more politically relevant question is another. Why did such a significant portion of Brazilian society once again decide to give its vote to this political camp?

Brazil has its own authoritarian memory. The country lived under a military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985 and built, beginning with the 1988 Constitution, a democratic architecture that cannot be considered irreversible. International experience demonstrates precisely that no democracy should consider itself permanently protected.

The current international scenario is telling us that we are not facing an exclusively European, Brazilian or Latin American phenomenon. We are facing a global transformation.

The lesson that few seem to have understood is that no democracy survives merely because it holds elections. It survives when winners accept limits, losers accept legitimate results, institutions remain independent, minorities retain their rights, and citizens continue to recognize their opponents as legitimate members of the same political community.

This is why the contemporary rise of the far right deserves attention. And this is also why Brazil's 2026 result should not be treated merely as another electoral alternation. The phenomenon needs to be understood.

Therefore, the historical experience and reference points provided by Germany, Italy, Portugal, Latin America and different authoritarian regimes offer a permanent warning: the existence of elections is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the existence of democracy.