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Europe and an Uncertain Future: Between the Crisis of Identity, the Politics of Passion, and the Decline of Strategic Rationality

23 minutes ago
9 min read

Wesley S. T. Guerra

Manager of the European Triangular Cooperation Fund


Europe is going through one of the most complex periods in its contemporary history. The integration project that, for decades, was presented as one of the greatest experiments in supranational cooperation, democratic stability, and social prosperity is beginning to show signs of political, economic, and institutional exhaustion. This is not necessarily the end of the European Union, nor does it mean the disappearance of its international relevance. Rather, it reflects a profound transformation of the conditions under which the European project exists. The continent that became accustomed to exporting governance models, defending multilateralism, and presenting the welfare state as an alternative to more deregulated forms of capitalism now faces an uncomfortable question: what kind of Europe does it intend to become in the coming decades?


The succession of crises that has marked the past fifteen years helps explain this transformation. First came the international financial crisis and the years of recession that particularly affected Southern European countries, exposing the weaknesses of a monetary union that had failed to develop sufficiently integrated fiscal and political instruments to address asymmetric shocks. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy experienced varying degrees of austerity, unemployment, indebtedness, and deterioration in social conditions. The euro crisis left its first scar: the perception that European solidarity had very clear limits whenever the financial interests and priorities of the most powerful member states were at stake.


This was followed by the Mediterranean migration crisis, which put to the test the principles of solidarity, shared responsibility, and freedom of movement underpinning the European discourse. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of people, particularly in 2015, exposed the absence of a genuinely common migration policy and deepened divisions among national governments. While some countries advocated mechanisms for sharing responsibilities, others opted for closing their borders and shifting the burden onto countries of first entry. Migration, which should be addressed as a demographic, humanitarian, economic, and social integration issue, progressively became one of the main instruments of electoral mobilisation.


The paradox is that this debate is taking place on a continent that is ageing rapidly, has birth rates insufficient to ensure population replacement, and faces growing difficulties in maintaining its workforce. According to Eurostat projections, the European Union's population, estimated at 451.8 million inhabitants in 2025, is expected to reach a peak of approximately 453.3 million in 2029 before entering a downward trajectory, falling to around 398.8 million by 2100. Population ageing is not a distant hypothesis, but a reality already placing pressure on pension systems, healthcare services, labour markets, and public finances. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20260416-1

Brexit represented another significant rupture, demonstrating that European integration was not an irreversible process. For the first time, a member state decided to leave the bloc, creating a political and symbolic precedent that weakened the narrative of ever-deeper integration. Shortly afterwards, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, above all, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought conventional warfare back to the centre of Europe's strategic agenda. The COVID-19 pandemic, in turn, exposed the continent's industrial and pharmaceutical dependencies, the limitations of national healthcare systems, and the difficulties of coordinating responses to a transnational emergency.


Each of these crises could have served as an opportunity to deepen integration and develop collective response mechanisms. In many cases, however, the outcome was the strengthening of national agendas, the fragmentation of public debate, and the growth of political forces questioning the very foundations of the European project.


Europe is now facing a new dimension of vulnerability: the deterioration of its strategic relationship with the United States. Donald Trump's return to the White House, during a second administration characterised by a more confrontational stance towards allies, has introduced new uncertainties into transatlantic security relations. The demand that NATO members increase their defence investments to reach 5% of annual GDP, in accordance with the commitment made at the 2025 Hague Summit, represents a significant shift in the budgetary priorities of European governments.


It is important to note that this commitment provides for at least 3.5% of GDP to be allocated to core military expenditure and up to 1.5% to other areas related to security, infrastructure, resilience, and defence. The target is to be achieved by 2035, meaning that it is not an immediate spending requirement. Nevertheless, its political and fiscal implications are evident: European governments will have to reconcile increased defence investment with societies demanding more resources for healthcare, education, housing, pensions, and social protection. https://nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration


The issue is not whether Europe needs to develop greater defence autonomy. The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that continental security cannot depend exclusively on external guarantees. The real challenge is understanding how to finance this transformation without compromising the social foundations that have legitimised the European model. After all, what is the point of building a military power if, at the same time, the material conditions underpinning social cohesion are deteriorating?


The economic outlook offers little reason for reassurance either. Germany, traditionally the bloc's industrial and economic engine, experienced two consecutive years of recession before recording growth of just 0.2% in 2025. France, meanwhile, is facing sluggish growth, high public deficits, and a debt level that, according to European Commission projections, could exceed 120% of GDP by 2027. The economic crisis is no longer confined to peripheral economies, as it was during the euro crisis. It has reached the very political and productive core of the European Union.


Added to this are the energy and geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, including the risks associated with the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's major oil transportation routes. Any prolonged disruption to maritime traffic through this passage could affect energy prices, inflation, and European industrial activity. On a continent still seeking to reduce its dependence on external energy supplies, the crises in the Persian Gulf demonstrate that Europe's strategic vulnerability is not confined to its geographical borders.


Against this backdrop, popular demonstrations, dissatisfaction with the cost of living, the housing crisis, pressure on public services, and growing political polarisation have become recurring features of the landscape in Europe's major cities. Citizens feel that they are working harder, facing greater difficulties in accessing decent housing, encountering increasingly overstretched public services, and witnessing governments that seem less and less capable of providing structural solutions. It is within this environment of frustration that simplistic political narratives flourish, frequently based on identifying enemies, assigning blame, and promising immediate solutions to problems that require long-term planning.


In this context, one can identify the emergence of a form of pathocracy, understood here as a metaphor for a political system governed by passions, resentment, and the permanent confrontation of identities, at the expense of administrative rationality, evidence-based policymaking, and management capacity. This is not to suggest that European democracies have ceased to exist, but rather to recognise that democratic debate appears increasingly conditioned by the emotional intensity of political narratives. Politics ceases to be primarily a space for negotiating divergent interests and, under certain circumstances, becomes a mechanism for the permanent mobilisation of fears and antagonisms.


The rise of the European far right is one expression of this phenomenon, although it is neither its sole cause nor something that can be explained exclusively by migration. In France, for example, the discourse of priorité nationale seeks to establish a distinction between citizens and foreigners in access to certain rights and benefits. However, France's own demographic reality demonstrates the complexity of this distinction. According to INSEE, in 2024 there were 7.6 million immigrants living in France, while millions of French citizens belonged to subsequent generations of migrant families. In 2025, descendants of immigrants of African origin already accounted for 48.3% of all immigrant descendants recorded by the institute. These are people born in France, many of whom have entirely French cultural, linguistic, and social ties. https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/8612512


French history, moreover, is inseparable from its territorial, cultural, and demographic diversity. From twentieth-century European immigration to migration flows from the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, and other regions, the formation of French society has been shaped by successive waves of human mobility. Nor can the diversity of populations in France's overseas territories, such as French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and New Caledonia, be ignored. The idea of a French national identity exclusively associated with a Caucasian ethnic background does not reflect the historical and territorial complexity of the French state itself.


In Italy, debates about mass deportations and agreements to transfer migrants to third countries coexist with a structural problem that rarely receives the same level of attention in political discourse: the demographic decline of certain regions, the concentration of economic activity in the north of the country, and the growing demand for workers in sectors such as agriculture, construction, elderly care, and services. In an ageing society, migration can form part of the response to labour shortages and the loss of economic dynamism in territories that have experienced decades of population decline. This does not mean that immigration automatically resolves regional inequalities or productivity problems. It does, however, highlight the contradiction of treating foreign labour as indispensable to the economy while simultaneously portraying it as a political problem to be eliminated.


In Spain, this contradiction takes on another dimension. The country is debating the need to dramatically expand housing supply, accelerate residential construction, and address a crisis that particularly affects young people and middle- and low-income families. The far right, which leads in opinion polls, promises to build one million homes. Yet the construction sector depends on a workforce in which foreign workers already play a significant role. According to the European Construction Observatory, foreign workers accounted for approximately 25.3% of employment in the Spanish construction sector in 2025, a proportion higher than their 15.7% share of the overall economy. This figure does not even include Spanish citizens of immigrant descent who also work in the sector.


The European problem, therefore, is not simply about deciding how many immigrants should be allowed to enter, remain, or leave. It is about developing a migration policy that is consistent with demographic realities, economic needs, the integration capacity of public services, and respect for fundamental rights. Turning immigration into a universal explanation for the housing crisis, labour precariousness, insecurity, or deficiencies in public services means shifting the debate away from structural causes towards their most visible consequences.


These contradictions are also evident in foreign policy. Europe condemns violations of international law and the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, yet European states maintain different positions and, in some cases, continue to authorise transfers of weapons, components, or military technologies to Israel. The discourse on defending human rights thus coexists with national decisions that are not always consistent with the principles being proclaimed. The same tension can be observed in Ukraine: governments advocate reducing certain public expenditures and maintaining fiscal discipline, while mobilising extraordinary resources to support Ukraine's defence and expand their own military capabilities. It is possible to support Ukraine's security while simultaneously questioning the transparency, distribution of costs, and fiscal sustainability of these decisions. What does not appear sustainable is avoiding debate about priorities and their social consequences.


The issue of Greenland adds another layer to this scenario. In September 2026, the United States, Denmark, and Greenland signed a new defence agreement that expands the American military presence and establishes new defence areas within the territory. The agreement formally reaffirms the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark and the right to self-determination of the Greenlandic people, while also expanding American operational influence in the Arctic. This is not, therefore, a transfer of territorial sovereignty, but a negotiation demonstrating how US strategic interests can, in practice, redefine Europe's decision-making and security arrangements. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-12214/


These contradictions are not necessarily proof of hypocrisy in every case. Governing means managing competing interests, setting priorities, and making difficult decisions. The problem arises when governments stop explaining the costs and consequences of their choices, replacing transparency with slogans and strategy with electoral communication.

Europe built part of its international relevance precisely on its ability to transform historical conflicts into institutions, national interests into shared commitments, and political rivalries into mechanisms for negotiation. It was this experience that enabled the continent to consolidate an integration model without historical precedent. However, the current fragmentation of public debate threatens one of Europe's greatest assets: its ability to build consensus and project a common vision of the future.


Europe's challenge is not to choose between security and social welfare, national identity and cultural diversity, economic competitiveness and environmental protection, or sovereignty and integration. The real challenge is to understand that these dimensions must be reconciled through institutions capable of planning, negotiating, and implementing consistent public policies.


Europe still possesses universities, research centres, infrastructure, industrial capacity, integrated markets, democratic institutions, and a diplomatic heritage that give it global relevance. However, these assets do not automatically guarantee its future influence. In an international system characterised by competition among major powers, technological transformation, disputes over strategic resources, and the reorganisation of production chains, the absence of a common strategy could turn historical advantages into vulnerabilities.


Perhaps the most important question is not whether Europe is in decline, but whether it still possesses the political capacity to recognise and correct its own contradictions. The continent that taught the world that institutional cooperation could overcome centuries of national rivalries must now demonstrate that it can still apply that same rationality to its own survival.


For an ageing Europe that cannot reconcile its demographic needs with its migration policies, that demands more resources for defence while seeking to preserve its social model, that proclaims universal principles but struggles to apply them consistently, and that transforms structural problems into electoral battles risks losing not only its international influence but also the trust of its own citizens.


Europe's future will not be determined exclusively by Washington, Moscow, Beijing, or conflicts in the Middle East. It will be determined, above all, by the ability of its own governments and institutions to decide what kind of society they intend to preserve and what role they wish to play in the world.


Europe does not necessarily need to become what it once was. Above all, it needs to understand what it has become.

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