Shift in Posture and Strategy: China’s New Approach Toward Taiwan

Eduardo Correia Leal Maranhão

INTRODUCTION

In recent weeks, a meeting took place between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), one of Taiwan’s main opposition political parties.The meeting was held in Beijing and involved Chinese President Xi Jinping and the KMT’s leading figure, Cheng Li-Wun. Its focus was the resumption of dialogue between Taiwan and China. In Taiwan, the KMT positions itself as a party favorable to rapprochement with China. This stance contrasts with that of Taiwan’s current ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocates for a foreign policy more aligned with the United States and more distant from Beijing.

 The meeting marked the end of an 11 year period without official meetings between political representatives from Taiwan and China, the last having taken place in 2015 in Singapore between the current Chinese president and former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT. As such, the April meeting holds symbolic value, marking a rapprochement between Taiwanese and Chinese political representatives amid an international context of rising tensions in Asia. Beyond its symbolic dimension, the meeting also produced positive consequences for relations between the two sides. China announced an initiative promoting measures aimed at fostering closer ties with Taiwan, although President Xi Jinping maintains China’s position of rejecting Taiwanese independence and defending “reunification” as the ultimate objective.

Among the main measures announced are the creation of a regular communication mechanism between China and the KMT; policies for sharing potable water, gas, and electricity; infrastructure projects aimed at building bridges to connect China to the island; the resumption of regular flights to Taiwanese cities; cultural and academic exchange policies; and the facilitation of Taiwanese agricultural exports.

 Following the meeting, the KMT leader emphasized the importance of a commitment between the party and the CCP to strengthen mutual political trust and expand trade and cultural exchange. Cheng Li-Wun also reaffirmed the party’s continued opposition to formal Taiwanese independence, adhering to the 1992 Consensus, which affirms the existence of “one China.”

 Thus, as a result of the meeting, relations between China and Taiwan have resumed and strengthened once again, reversing the trend observed since the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2016. This rapprochement may indicate a shift in China’s posture toward the island and could generate consequences aligned with Beijing’s strategic interests.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN

Since 2016, when it severed official relations with Taiwan, China has increased political and military pressure on Taipei, adopting a hardline posture that employs deterrent capabilities as a tool of coercion against the island. In recent years, alongside China’s military growth, naval exercises conducted closer to Taiwan’s coast have become more frequent, reflecting Beijing’s stance regarding its relationship with the island. Military exercises carried out in 2022 and at the end of 2025 can be interpreted as episodes illustrating China’s posture in recent years.

 According to American political scientist John Mearsheimer, great powers seek to achieve regional hegemony, as global hegemony is not feasible within his theoretical framework. From this perspective, China’s claim over Taiwan represents a primary strategic objective for its future, given the island’s geopolitical importance. Due to its close relations with the United States, Taiwan is viewed by China as a point of resistance to Beijing’s regional hegemony, potentially serving as a location for U.S. military forces and strengthening Washington’s technological industry, as it is one of the world’s leading centers for semiconductor production, materials essential for the development of artificial intelligence.

Consequently, beyond posing potential threats to China due to its geographic proximity and relationship with Washington, Taiwan also strengthens the United States by supplying semiconductors and maintaining extensive trade relations, in which the United States is the second-largest destination for Taiwanese exports. Additionally, Taiwan helps reinforce the American maritime presence aimed at containing China in the South China Sea and across Asia. In this context, Beijing views its claim over the island as essential to maintaining its regional hegemony.

Thus, according to authors such as Elbridge Colby, China may attempt to take Taiwan as a decisive step toward dominating Asia. This perspective is grounded in the strategic importance of the region and in China’s recent behavior, which has increasingly emphasized territorial incorporation and the execution of military exercises, as previously discussed.

SHIFT IN POSTURE?

Although China has adopted a more confrontational stance since 2016, with the recent resumption of rapprochement with the KMT and the adoption of cooperative measures, it may be employing a new posture to move closer to the island and pursue its objectives. Acting with diplomatic emphasis, rather than military, remains a principle of Chinese foreign policy, which recognizes the economic and political costs that conflicts entail. In line with this principle, China has avoided direct involvement in conflicts, prioritizing its economic and commercial growth as a means of expanding its influence and power within the international system.

 The increase in its diplomatic prestige and economic capacity has provided Beijing with greater strength and opportunities, which it has used to create foreign policy instruments that maximize both its political and commercial interests, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its participation in multilateral forums like BRICS. In this way, direct military actions have been avoided by China, as they run counter to the principles, achievements, and interests built by Chinese diplomacy over the years.

Thus, although the situation with Taiwan has been handled with greater military emphasis by Beijing, given that it is not an ordinary case, if there is room for a more diplomatic approach toward the island aimed at reunification, China based on its diplomatic history and identity is likely to avoid actions involving the use of force. This would imply adopting a posture of greater proximity toward Taiwan, as demonstrated by the meeting between the KMT and Chinese President Xi Jinping, as well as the implementation of cooperative measures with the island, something that had not occurred since the tenure of former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016).

 In this sense, the meeting and the creation of cooperative measures may indicate a shift in China’s posture toward Taiwan, with Beijing potentially opting for approaches centered on cooperation. Such strategies would aim to achieve political and commercial penetration, drawing the island closer to China while distancing it from the United States, without resorting to the use of force, although the latter is not ruled out as a last resort.

POSSIBLE DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES

Within Taiwan, if the renewed rapprochement with China is positively perceived by the population, the KMT may gain strength ahead of the next national presidential election, scheduled for 2028. Although the Democratic Progressive Party secured a majority in the most recent presidential elections (2016, 2020, and 2024), external developments may influence a potential shift in 2028.

Actions taken by the United States under the administration of Donald Trump, particularly the imposition of 20% tariffs in the past year, have negatively impacted Taiwanese industries, raising doubts among parts of the population regarding the level of proximity and trust Taipei should maintain with Washington.

Alongside this growing skepticism, there has been an improvement in the political image of the KMT under the leadership of Cheng Li-Wun. Combined with the cooperative measures adopted by China following the meeting with the KMT leader, this may contribute to a weakening of the current ruling party, which despite winning the last election, experienced a decline in popular support, dropping from 57% of the vote in 2020 to 40% in 2024.

In the coming months, local elections will take place in Taiwan to determine mayors, governors, council members, and other officials. These elections may prove crucial for the 2028 presidential race, as they could signal a potential increase in the KMT’s political strength. Should the party achieve significant victories, it may further consolidate its position ahead of the 2028 elections.

In a scenario where the KMT returns to power, relations with China would likely deepen considerably across political, cultural, commercial, and possibly even military dimensions. Such developments would be beneficial to Beijing, which would expand its influence in the region while simultaneously reducing that of the United States.

CHINA’S INTERESTS

For Beijing, rapprochement with Taiwan would generate multiple benefits, contributing to the consolidation of its regional position in East Asia. The commercial sphere would be one of the beneficiaries of such rapprochement, though not solely due to increased trade, as the primary gains for China would be political.                  

According to Albert O. Hirschman, international economic relations are never perfectly symmetrical; rather, one side typically depends more on the other, creating asymmetries in dependence and in the importance of trade. From this perspective, trade relationships can be deliberately constructed by state elites seeking to shape economic ties in ways that render their partners more dependent than themselves.

Following this logic, if commercial rapprochement between China and Taiwan continues and deepens beyond the levels observed in recent years, Beijing could seek to increase trade asymmetry with Taipei while simultaneously strengthening complex interdependence with the island. Although there is already a substantial volume of trade between the two sides, where, according to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, China was Taiwan’s largest export destination and import partner in 2024, greater political rapprochement could significantly expand cross-strait trade flows.

As a result, mutual commercial demand would increase, and both markets could become more open to one another. This is already expected in sectors such as agriculture, following the announcement of measures by Beijing to facilitate the entry of Taiwanese agricultural products.

Thus, the gains for Beijing would not be merely commercial. With the expansion in trade volume and sectors, there would also be an increase in asymmetry within the relationship, generating political advantages for China derived from Taiwan’s growing dependence and from the increased relevance of China’s economy to the island. In this way, trade asymmetry would become an instrument of foreign policy, capable of producing gains for China without resorting to the use of force as a first option.

From a geopolitical standpoint, rapprochement could also lead to a distancing of Taipei from Washington and an expansion of China’s strategic margin in the Taiwan Strait. The strengthening of political ties with Taiwan would tend, gradually, to reduce the role of the United States in regional security dynamics, while potentially granting China greater freedom of maritime maneuver. This aligns with China’s ongoing efforts to expand its naval capabilities throughout its surrounding Asian region.

CONCLUSION

Thus, with the meeting held between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the KMT leader, as well as the adoption of cooperative measures directed toward Taiwan, China may be signaling a shift in its posture regarding the approach it has employed toward the island. Rather than exclusively prioritizing coercive and deterrent instruments, Beijing may begin to emphasize economic and political rapprochement as tools to pursue its objectives, primarily to gain internal influence by drawing closer while simultaneously distancing Taipei from the American sphere, and secondarily to facilitate reunification with the island in a more gradual and natural manner through diplomatic means, rather than through the use of force.

Therefore, the meeting held in April between the KMT leadership and the Chinese government has the potential to produce profound consequences for relations across the Taiwan Strait, as it marks the return of dialogue and cooperation between Beijing and Taipei. These dynamics may deepen in the coming years, potentially leading to significant changes in Asian geopolitical dynamics.

REFERENCES

FREEDMAN, Joshua. The Present and Future of the KMT in Taiwan. Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 18, 2025. Available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/12/the-present-and-future-of-the-kmt-in-taiwan/. Accessed on: April 22, 2026.

Observatory of Economic Complexity. Taiwan Country Profile. Available at: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/twn. Accessed on: April 22, 2026.

SACKS, David. China–Taiwan Relations and U.S. Policy. Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2026. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump. Accessed on: April 22, 2026.

Opera Mundi. China Announces Ten Measures to Promote Rapprochement with Taiwan. April 13, 2026. Available at: https://operamundi.uol.com.br/asia/china-anuncia-dez-medidas-para-promover-reaproximacao-com-taiwan/. Accessed on: April 22, 2026.

MEARSHEIMER, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.

COLBY, Elbridge. The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021.

ONUF, Nicholas. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. London: Routledge, 2013

Eduardo Correia Leal Maranhão

Undergraduate student in International Relations at La Salle University (Rio de Janeiro), with a focus on foreign policy, geopolitics, and international security. He serves as a researcher on the Europe region at the Center for Strategic Assessment (NAC) of the Brazilian Naval War College and has completed a volunteer internship at the Brazilian Joint Center for Peace Operations, supporting the training of United Nations peacekeepers. He was awarded a bronze medal at the Brazilian Geopolitics Olympiad, organized by Seleta Educação, and achieved high-performance distinction at the Brazilian Odyssey of Diplomacy and International Relations, organized by Grupo Ubique Júnior.

Link LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/eduardo-correia-857851353