Who will translate this mobilization into effective participation? An Analysis of the September 2025 Protests in Nepal in the Light of Frantz Fanon's Concepts of Violence and Agency
Flávia Abud Luz
In the first weeks of September 2025, Kathmandu and several other cities in Nepal were the scene of massive demonstrations — led mostly by young people from "Generation Z" — protesting against a government action to block social media platforms. Added to this, we have as a backdrop a society marked by unemployment, inequality (social and economic), corruption and crises of political legitimacy in a movement that has already been observed at some times in the recent history of societies in the Middle East and North Africa that have gone through processes of political and social questioning in the last quarter of the twentieth century and throughout the first decades of the twenty-first century.
A central aspect of the media coverage of the events that took place in the Asian country was the questioning of the use of violence. On the one hand, there were reports of violent acts by some protesters. On the other, we have the violence perpetrated by the state security forces in their attempt to repress the mobilizations, a fact that even generated a position note from the Human Rights Council of the United Nations Human Rights Organization[1].
The main objective of this article is to analyze, even if briefly, the Nepalese conjuncture in the light of Frantz Fanon's thought — especially his reflection on violence in the processes of territorial and epistemic decolonization — to investigate the hypothesis that such protests can be interpreted as a form of contestation of the status quo and a political and economic system that still reproduces power asymmetries — as Fanon would suggest in contexts of colonialism. In other words, although Nepal has not experienced a process of direct colonization, it has historically been the scene of influence and dispute by states that sought to increase their projection of power in Asia. This influence and power struggle had significant consequences for the process of forming a political-economic elite capable of being sensitive to external influence and the pressures of domestic politics as well.
Thus, it would be possible to conjecture that in the small Asian country the power structures, hierarchies and modes of domination that refer to an internal centralization of power persisted; an element that the recent protests led by Nepalese youth sought to question.
September 2025: Outbreak of protests in the face of the institutional freeze
It is crucial to analyze the popular demonstrations that took to the streets of Nepal in 2025 in light of a history of political turmoil and discontent that intensified after the extinction of the monarchy in 2008. Acts of violence involving state security forces and protesters had been of such gravity in actions as late as 2006 (in April and November), when King Gyanendra was removed from power and a ceasefire agreement was concluded between government forces and the Nepal-Maoist Communist Party[2]. The change to the republican system and the creation of the 2015 Constitution generated hopes for participation, social equity and economic progress.
However, the inability of the governments that followed to establish robust democratic institutions, along with the division between parties and internal conflicts, culminated in a government characterized by indecision, corruption, and little attention to the wishes of the population. This situation has encouraged a growing distrust in political leadership, especially among young people in the cities, who have led the most recent protests.
The growing discontent has been driven by the financial crisis, intensified by the economic downturn in the region and heavy reliance on cash transfers from migrant workers. Many young people, even with good education, struggle with unemployment or precarious jobs, and rural areas remain left behind when it comes to infrastructure and the availability of government services. The anger of the population grew after the brutal response of the government, which employed lethal force and blocked access to social networks for a period.
The impression that the government does not present tangible prospects for the future – especially in a nation beset by ongoing inequalities between ethnicities and castes – fosters an environment conducive to protest.
Online censorship, in particular, carried a strong meaning: in a country where young people organize politically through digital platforms, the interruption of internet access was seen as a direct blow to freedom of expression and the right to participate in politics, transforming the digital space into a new stage of conflict between the government and the population. Thus, the 2025 demonstrations arise as a consequence of a mixture of socioeconomic disappointment and political exhaustion that has accumulated.
Frantz Fanon and his reflections on violence in the processes of territorial and epistemic decolonization
Frantz Fanon's thought, especially in The Wretched of the Earth (1968), offers potent theoretical tools for understanding how structures of domination can persist even after the end of a formally oppressive regime. Fanon argues that violence is constitutive of the colonial order and that, therefore, decolonization, in order to be effective, needs to break with this logic, not only at the institutional level, but also at the subjective level.
Structural violence — expressed in the marginalization of ethnic groups, subordinate castes, and unemployed youth — reveals the permanence of a system that Fanon would describe as incompatible with popular emancipation.
A fundamental element in Fanon's theory is the critique of the psychological impact of domination. For him, the colonized internalize inferiority, fear and passivity. Insurgent political action, in this sense, has a "liberating catharsis" effect, allowing oppressed subjects to recognize themselves as historical agents. mobilization breaks with the apathy induced by years of unfulfilled promises and rigid political structures that limit popular participation. State repression, the control of bodies and the criminalization of demonstrations would thus reveal the intention of the political elites to preserve an order that Fanon would consider "dehumanizing", since it neglects citizens the possibility of fully asserting their political agency.
The postcolonial elite tends to take the place of the colonizer – reproducing the same logics of privilege, clientelism, and exploitation that the author describes as the central actions of a group that does not seek the real transformation of the social order, but only the management of the existing stagnation and asymmetry of power. Such criticism of the actions of the political elites becomes a kind of warning: without genuine popular participation and without a deep break with the colonial logic, independence runs the risk of becoming only formal, leaving social hierarchies and the marginalization of the masses intact.
Nepalese protests in the light of the Fanonian theory
The popular demonstrations that erupted in Nepal in September 2025 can be seen as a modern reflection of the persistent difficulties in the inconclusive decolonization processes. Although the country has not undergone formal colonization like the European one, its recent history reveals the continuity of systems of power that perpetuate racial, caste, gender, and class inequalities — systems that, in a perspective inspired by Fanon, keep the colonial mentality alive in new forms.
The Nepalese youth who staged the protests express a movement that Fanon would call the reappropriation of political agency. The blocking of social networks, determined by the government, was not only an administrative measure, but an attempt to control the discursive space — a gesture of "symbolic violence" that, by restricting communication and criticism, reaffirms the authority of the State over bodies and voices. Popular reaction, on the other hand, can be read as an act of ontological resistance: an effort to break with the condition of passivity and to assert one's own political voice.
In this sense, the violence that emerges — both state repression and resistance in the streets — acquires a dialectical dimension. In Nepal, the state's institutional violence — embodied in the use of lethal force against protesters — reflects the inability of political elites to democratically address popular dissent and dissent. At the same time, the popular insurrection, even if not armed, reveals the political power of symbolic violence as a form of rupture. This dialectic recalls Fanon's analysis according to which the colonized only conquers their humanity in the context in which they liberate themselves — a process that requires confrontation, not conciliation.
The real challenge is the moment after the revolt – that of political and social reconstruction. This analysis fits very well with the situation in Nepal. After the monarchy ended, the country went through several coalition governments that failed to put in place actions to divide wealth more fairly or give more voice to the population. Nepal's multi-party system, where the rules of the game are still determined by old figures and influence games, has become a perfect place for the disappointment of young people, who expected democracy and progress, and have come across an elite nationalism where the government helps a small group of wealthy people, rather than serving everyone.
Seen from this angle, the 2025 demonstrations represent a head-on clash with a specific project of nationalism and the lack of significant changes, that is, they highlight the great distance between independence only on paper and true liberation, between a republic on the political level and economic and cultural subordination. Thus, the current struggle is not between colonizer and colonized, but between the people and the elites that reproduce the system of exclusion — a clash between the promise of a new society and the reality of a State that resists transformation.
The appointment of an interim government, led by Prime Minister Sushila Karki in October, brought with it the promise of a kind of national "pacification" amid the constant perception of impunity for a series of human rights violations in the country, as well as the subsequent impunity entrenched in local political elites at times of great social upheaval. such as those that occurred between 1996 and 2006. Also in this sense, Karki'[3]s government committed to releasing in the post-election context of March 2026 a series of documents, reports and inquiries into such facts and said it understood that the so-called "Generation Z" protests, which took place in September 2025, revealed precisely the popular frustration with previous administrations and were a cry for the development of a new social and political pact, aimed at the real improvement in people's living conditions.
In March 2026, the elections in Nepal brought a relevant turning point: the arrival to national power of Balendra Balen Shah, a young political leader outside the traditional context that since the end of the monarchy was marked by the maintenance of older political figures who used the system to maintain economic and political privileges.
Shah's victory represented an important break in the way Nepalese political system was structured; But the most relevant thing here is not only to observe this fact, but to contextualize it, to understand the complex political forces that made it possible, I explain. During some electoral cycles, various sectors of the population, especially young people, demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the living conditions in the country: social inequality, corruption, economic deterioration, high unemployment, a fact that intensified the migratory flow to other countries.
In 2022 Shah appeared on the political scene in Kathmandu by launching himself as an independent candidate and winning the mayoral election with a political-social platform based on the demand for transparency, anti-corruption fighting, economic reforms, and questioning the traditional party structure. Years later, and especially after the massive protests of 2025, Shah became an embodiment of the will for change expressed in the streets.
However, the Fanonian doubt remained: will the revolutionary energy of the youth be channeled into a structural transformation, or would it be absorbed by the same elites that have historically repressed it?
The answer to the question is complex because of aspects that relate domestic politics and the most direct geopolitical interests of regional powers, namely India and China. India has historically viewed Nepal as part of its natural sphere of influence, underpinned by an open border, deep trade ties, and a growing partnership in hydropower. China, for its part, has steadily expanded its presence in recent years, funding transport and infrastructure corridors linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, and more recently also advancing in areas such as digital connectivity and public administration capacity, which were previously occupied almost exclusively by Western donors.
Shah does not come from any of the traditional political networks that India and China have learned to deal with over the past few decades. This does not mean a rupture in Nepalese foreign policy, given that geography and economic dependence continue to impose real limits on any government in Kathmandu, but it does make room for less predictable diplomacy, led by a generation of leaders without the same inherited ties to regional elites. For India and China, the unknown is not whether Nepal will switch sides, but whether it will become a more difficult partner to decipher.
Who will translate this mobilization? Considerations for possible steps
Nepal concentrates a considerable part of the springs that feed the great rivers of South Asia, and its hydroelectric potential that is still little explored is often cited as a relevant part of the region's energy transitions. With the accelerated melting of Himalayan glaciers and the growing competition for water resources, decisions made in Kathmandu on water management and cross-border energy trade are no longer a purely domestic matter, but are closely watched by neighbouring countries, especially India and China.
Another point that needs to be highlighted is the dismantling of much of the US cooperation for the development of programs that supported civil society, the fight against corruption and the strengthening of local Nepalese governance.
Balen Shah's electoral victory is, in itself, a milestone for national politics as it demonstrates that a relevant portion of the Nepalese electorate was willing to abandon traditional parties. However, we know that elections resolve power disputes, not problems of state capacity, that is, over the next few months the government will need to demonstrate results on at least one concrete front — such as fighting corruption, seeking job creation or strengthening local institutions — otherwise the political energy that brought it to power will quickly be dissolved. In a region where climate, water and the balance of power between neighboring giants intersect in an increasingly tense way, the way Kathmandu governs itself in the coming years will carry weight that goes far beyond the country's borders.
Bibliographic References
AMNESTRY INTERNATIONAL. Nepal: Publish Reports on Violent Crackdowns on Protests. Available in: https://www.amnesty.org/ru/documents/asa31/0715/2026/en/ . Accessed in: Jul 2026.
FANON, Frantz. The wretched of the earth. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1968.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. Nepal: events of 2006. Disponível em: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2007/country-chapters/nepal. Acesso em: jun 2025.
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. Nepal: Call for prompt, transparent investigation into killings of protesters. Disponível em: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/nepal-call-prompt-transparent-investigation-killings-protesters. Acesso em: jul 2026.
[1] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/nepal-call-prompt-transparent-investigation-killings-protesters
2 Human Rights Watch. Nepal: events of 2006. Disponível em: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2007/country-chapters/nepal
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