From Struggle to Politics: The Meaning of the Death of an Ayatollah
- CERES
- 3 days ago
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Flávia Abud Luz
The confirmation of the death of Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran, announced this Sunday (03/01/2026) by the state communication network, was followed by a series of questions in both the international and domestic arenas, mostly concerning the stability of the Iranian regime and the impact of a forced power transition on regional security—especially in light of the attacks initiated by the Persian country against U.S. bases located in countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan.
The official statement of mourning delivered by the office of President Masoud Pezeshkian set the tone of the moment: recourse to the narrative of martyrdom embedded in the history of Shiism (particularly its Twelver branch, i.e., Shiites who follow the doctrine of the Twelve Imams), condemnation of the military actions of the United States and Israel (its regional ally), and a promise of revenge in response to the attack. This stance has placed foreign policy decision-makers and analysts on alert regarding possible international developments within the established regional dynamics, especially considering the ideological and theological links between the Supreme Leader and Shiite populations in the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq) and the Persian Gulf.
The current situation is complex and multifaceted, requiring an understanding of key aspects:(a) the role of the Supreme Leader after the 1979 Islamic Revolution; the relevance of the martyrdom narrative in Shiite history and its appropriation by the regime (as in the Iran–Iraq War) and in the context of Khamenei’s death;(b) the crisis of legitimacy facing the Iranian regime since the massive 2022 protests following the death of the young woman Mahsa Amini.
Thus, the purpose of this text is to provide a brief contextual analysis addressing the points above in order to outline a framework that may help in understanding possible developments in the Iranian and international contexts, considering the established regional dynamics.
a) The Role of the Supreme Leader after the 1979 Islamic Revolution
The Supreme Leader is the head of state and the highest political-religious authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although not formally part of any of the three branches of government, he stands above them through powers of appointment and supervision. Institutionally, the office embodies the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), which merges political-religious and social dimensions by allowing a cleric to perform functions traditionally associated with the Imams, such as political and spiritual leadership of the community and the conduct of jihad, acting as a form of substitution following the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in the 10th century (Fischer, 1980).
After the Iranian Revolution, the role of Supreme Leader was assumed by Ruhollah Khomeini, who transitioned from a charismatic opposition figure to the head of a theocratic state. His leadership consolidated the principle of rule by the jurist as the structural foundation of the new regime, granting the Supreme Leader broad authority over the Armed Forces, the Judiciary, state media, and the appointment of key members of the Guardian Council.
Khomeini profoundly transformed Iran’s political system, replacing the monarchy of the Shah with a form of constitutional theocracy in which popular sovereignty was subordinated to clerical oversight. Between 1979 and his death in 1989, he exercised decisive leadership during critical moments such as regime consolidation, repression of secular and leftist opposition, and the conduct of the Iran–Iraq War.
His charismatic authority was central in legitimizing social and military mobilization, particularly through the reinterpretation of martyrdom and jihad as defense of Islam, the Islamic Republic, or both. His authority was also used to restructure the clerical hierarchy, politically neutralizing opponents such as Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari, thereby reinforcing the dependence of clerical standing on state power linked to the wali al-faqih.
Internationally impactful religious decrees—such as the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie—demonstrated the transnational projection of his authority. By the end of his life, Khomeini had consolidated a hybrid model of republicanism supervised by supreme clerical authority, ensuring institutional continuity with the succession of Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei’s appointment required constitutional amendments to permit his nomination despite lacking the highest traditional clerical rank (marja’), signaling the primacy of political authority over clerical credentials. This marked the transformation of the Supreme Leader’s position into a central political and security command structure.
b) The Relevance of the Martyrdom Narrative in Shiism and Its Political Appropriation
The martyrdom of Imam Hussein and his companions in 680 CE on the plains of Karbala (present-day Iraq) was a decisive turning point in Islamic history, shaping Shiite political-religious doctrine and identity. The narrative of Karbala—evoking suffering, justice, and sacrifice—acquired political significance over time, becoming a tool for critique against both external “enemies” (imperialism, colonialism) and internal rulers.
In modern Iran, the ritual of Ashura became central to political mobilization, particularly during opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty. During the Iran–Iraq War, the Karbala narrative legitimized social and religious mobilization, presenting Imam Hussein as a model of resistance against oppression.
The confirmation of Khamenei’s death has reactivated this martyrdom narrative within Twelver Shiism, framing his death as part of Islam’s historical struggle against injustice. In this context, the role of “oppressor” has been attributed to the United States and Israel, while Khamenei is portrayed as resisting injustice and foreign interference. The timing of the attack during Ramadan, Islam’s holy month, adds symbolic weight.
Conversely, U.S. rhetoric has justified the strikes by invoking concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In press conferences and social media statements, President Donald Trump described the action as an act of defense for the American people and emphasized the need for regime transition to ensure Israel’s security.
c) The Regime’s Legitimacy Crisis Since the 2022 Protests
In 2022, widespread protests erupted in cities such as Tehran and Saqez following the death of Mahsa Amini after her detention by the morality police for allegedly improperly wearing the hijab. Women, students, and workers openly challenged the regime’s authority, raising demands for women’s rights and broader freedoms.
Unlike the 2009 Green Movement protests, the 2022–2023 mobilizations reflected broader social participation and more radical demands, questioning not only authoritarianism but also economic disparities exacerbated by international sanctions.
The regime responded with repression, internet shutdowns, and arrests, framing protests as Western interference. Despite coercion, protests persisted into 2023 and reemerged in early 2026. Recently, in February 2026, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was added to the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations.
Khamenei’s death shifts the balance of political and religious forces. The Supreme Leader concentrates central constitutional powers, including command of the Armed Forces, appointment of the Judiciary chief, influence over the Guardian Council, and strategic control over foreign and security policy. Succession is determined by the Assembly of Experts.
The transition may prove difficult due to internal fragmentation among clerics, the Revolutionary Guard, and pragmatic factions; accumulated social and economic pressures; and the possibility of political militarization through expanded IRGC influence.
Initial reactions are still unfolding. The stance of the theocratic government regarding retaliatory attacks against U.S. bases in the Gulf, as well as the role of interim leader Alireza Arafi—who joined the transition council on 03/01/2026—will be crucial. The pieces continue to move on the chessboard of international politics.
References
ARMSTRONG, Karen. In the Name of God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam.MIR-HOSSEINI, Ziba. “Beyond ‘Islam’ vs ‘Feminism.’” IDS Bulletin, 2011.MOMEN, Moojan. An Introduction to Shi’i Islam. Yale University Press, 1985.SAFFARI, S. “The legitimation of the Clergy's right to rule in the Iranian constitution of 1979.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1993.FISCHER, Michael M. J. “Becoming Mollah.” Iranian Studies, 1980.
Flávia Abud Luz
Professor of International Relations. Ph.D. in Human and Social Sciences (UFABC). M.A. in Religious Studies (Mackenzie Presbyterian University). Specialist in Politics and International Relations (FESPSP). B.A. in International Relations (FAAP).
Research interests: postcolonial theories, gender relations, human rights and women’s movements, international conflicts, politics and religion, especially Middle Eastern politics (Levant and Persian Gulf), and Lebanese domestic politics.
Author of Islamic Feminism, Social Movements and the Reconstruction of Women’s Rights in Morocco (Editora Appris, 2025) and The Appropriation of the Concepts of Martyrdom and Jihad by Hezbollah and the Question of Violence as Resistance (Editora Appris, 2020). Currently researching the intersections between gender, religion, and International Relations. Member of multiple research groups and affiliated with the Brazilian Association of International Relations (ABRI).
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