The Duel of Africa’s Gas Corridors: An Indicator of Euro-African Geopolitical Restructuring

Marco Alves

Strategic Rivalry Between Algeria and Morocco Over the Continent’s Energy Future (2026–2040)

The relaunch of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) project in 2026 marks one of the most significant geoeconomic developments on the African continent since the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Long considered unfeasible due to security challenges in the Sahel, the project now benefits from a profoundly transformed strategic context: Europe’s energy crisis resulting from the war in Ukraine, the restructuring of political balances in the Sahel, the rise of new regional powers, and the intensification of global competition for access to energy resources.

In contrast, the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP), promoted by Morocco, represents an alternative vision of African energy integration. Longer, more expensive, yet also more inclusive, it forms part of Morocco’s strategy to expand its influence in West Africa and consolidate its role as a bridge between Europe and Africa.

What is at stake extends far beyond the transportation of Nigerian gas. These two infrastructures embody competing visions of Africa’s geoeconomic organization, different models of regional integration, and rival conceptions of continental leadership. They are also part of the new global competition to secure energy supplies, in which Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on Russia while emerging powers increase their investments across Africa.

The winner of this competition will not merely control an energy corridor. It may shape the balance of power between the Maghreb, the Sahel, and Europe for decades to come.

I. Nigeria: The Epicenter of Gas in Africa

Any analysis of the TSGP and NMGP projects must begin with a fundamental observation: Nigeria currently possesses the largest gas reserves on the African continent.

According to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria holds proven reserves exceeding 200 trillion cubic feet, equivalent to approximately 5.7 trillion cubic meters. These reserves surpass those of Algeria and account for nearly one-third of Africa’s known natural gas resources.

Yet this potential remains largely underutilized. The country continues to flare a significant portion of the gas associated with oil production and faces chronic infrastructure deficiencies. Domestic consumption is growing rapidly due to population growth and urbanization, but export capacity remains insufficient relative to the available potential.

In this context, pipelines emerge as a strategic instrument of major importance. They would not only enable Nigeria to better monetize its resources but also strengthen Abuja’s geopolitical influence across the continent.

Nigeria thus finds itself in a position comparable to that of certain Gulf states: rich in resources but dependent on export corridors whose control constitutes a significant power challenge.

II. Two Competing Visions of African Energy Integration

The debate between the TSGP and the NMGP is not simply a technical comparison between two infrastructures.

In reality, it reflects two competing conceptions of continental development.

The Algerian approach prioritizes the logic of a direct strategic corridor. The TSGP seeks to establish a rapid connection between Nigerian reserves and existing European infrastructure. This vision is based on the idea that the primary objective is to meet international demand while strengthening interconnections between the Sahel and North Africa.

The Moroccan approach differs significantly. The NMGP was conceived as a regional integration tool. Its route is intended to serve several West African countries and contribute to their electrification, industrialization, and economic development. The project therefore extends beyond a simple export route to Europe.

This difference in philosophy largely explains the nature of the current competition.

III. The Geopolitical Transformation of the Sahel: A Decisive Factor

For nearly two decades, the principal obstacle to the TSGP was the perception of risk in the Sahel.

Successive crises in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso convinced many international investors that the trans-Sahelian corridor was excessively risky.

However, since 2023, a significant shift has occurred.

The gradual rupture between several Sahelian states and their traditional Western partners has led to a profound reconfiguration of regional alliances. The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), bringing together Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, has opened a new geopolitical phase.

For Algiers, this evolution represents an exceptional strategic opportunity. Algeria has long maintained an active neighborhood policy with Niger. Unlike several external powers, it is not perceived as an interventionist actor. Furthermore, it possesses recognized expertise in managing desert territories and energy infrastructure.

The growing rapprochement between Algiers and Niamey therefore follows a mutually beneficial logic: Niger seeks transformative investment, while Algeria aims to secure a strategic corridor.

IV. Europe After the Break with Russia: The Birth of a New Energy Geography

The war in Ukraine is probably the geopolitical event that has most profoundly altered the prospects of both projects.

Before 2022, Russia supplied approximately 40 percent of the natural gas consumed by the European Union. This dependency constituted one of the pillars of Europe’s energy architecture since the end of the Cold War.

The invasion of Ukraine abruptly challenged this model.

Between 2022 and 2025, the European Union launched an unprecedented diversification policy. The REPowerEU initiative explicitly aims to reduce dependence on Russian hydrocarbons and expand alternative sources of supply. Within this strategy, Africa occupies a central position.

Algeria became the European Union’s second-largest gas supplier after Norway in certain Mediterranean market segments. Algerian exports to Italy increased significantly after 2022, reinforcing Rome’s role as a European energy hub.

This dynamic explains Italy’s growing interest in the TSGP.

The Italian government developed the Mattei Plan, presented as a strategic partnership with Africa. Behind the rhetoric of cooperation lies a concrete objective: transforming Italy into the principal energy hub of Southern Europe.

For Rome, connecting Nigerian gas to Algeria’s existing network would provide a considerable advantage. Unlike the Moroccan project, it could be integrated relatively quickly into existing infrastructure.

Nevertheless, Europe is not a homogeneous actor.

Spain maintains close energy ties with Morocco, while several European institutions view the NMGP as a regional development instrument aligned with broader Euro-African cooperation objectives.

The competition between the two projects therefore also reflects diverging interests within the European Union itself.

V. Gas as an Instrument of Power: The Algeria–Morocco Rivalry

To understand the significance of the duel between these two pipelines, it must be placed within the broader context of Algeria–Morocco relations. For decades, both countries have pursued competing strategies of regional influence.

The closure of their land border since 1994, tensions over Western Sahara, and diplomatic disagreements have gradually transformed their relationship into a systemic rivalry.

In this context, energy has become a tool of power projection.

For Morocco, the NMGP represents the culmination of its African strategy launched in the early 2000s. Rabat has considerably expanded its banking, financial, industrial, and diplomatic presence throughout West Africa. The pipeline is a natural extension of this policy. The project would allow Morocco to consolidate its role as a logistical, energy, and financial platform connecting Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa.

For Algeria, the stakes are different.

As Africa’s leading gas exporter for several decades, Algiers sees the TSGP as an opportunity to preserve its status within a rapidly changing global energy landscape.

The global energy transition could gradually reduce demand for hydrocarbons in the long term. Consequently, securing new transit volumes quickly has become a strategic priority.

This competition is therefore not merely about future revenues. It also concerns each country’s ability to shape North Africa’s energy architecture throughout the twenty-first century.

VI. Prospective Scenarios for 2040

The future of both projects will depend on several critical variables.

Security

A sustainable improvement in stability in Niger would considerably strengthen the prospects of the TSGP. Conversely, a prolonged deterioration in security conditions could delay the project by several years.

Finance

The required investments are enormous. International investors will have to choose between a shorter project exposed to greater security risks and a more expensive project offering broader political diversification.

Energy Demand

European demand could evolve more rapidly than anticipated as a result of the energy transition. If gas consumption declines significantly after 2035, the profitability of both projects could be affected.

Conversely, a slower transition would reinforce their economic relevance.

Coexistence

A fourth scenario deserves consideration: coexistence.

According to United Nations projections, Africa’s population is expected to exceed 2.5 billion by 2050. The continent’s energy needs could more than double during the same period.

Under such circumstances, both pipelines could ultimately serve different markets and become complementary rather than competing projects.

Conclusion

The duel between the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline and the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline represents one of the major African geopolitical issues of the decade. It reflects the simultaneous transformation of several strategic spaces: the Maghreb, the Sahel, West Africa, and Mediterranean Europe.

Algeria currently enjoys significant advantages in terms of distance, existing infrastructure, and potential speed of implementation. Morocco, meanwhile, benefits from a more inclusive approach, more strongly oriented toward regional integration and risk diversification.

Ultimately, the central question may not be which project prevails, but rather which vision of African integration will triumph: that of major continental corridors directly linking resources to international markets, or that of multipolar regional networks designed to structure African economic development.

The answer to this question will help shape the continent’s economic geography in the coming decades. It will also determine Africa’s place within the new global energy order emerging from the collapse of the post–Cold War equilibrium.

Bibliography

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• Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (2024), World Oil and Gas Outlook.

• European Commission (2022–2024), REPowerEU Plan.

• World Bank (2023), Africa’s Pulse and Sahel Economic Reports.

• International Crisis Group (ICG) (2023–2025), Sahel Security Reports.

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• French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) (2023–2025), IFRI Energy Papers.

Marco Alves

Master in Political Science from the University of Paris Nanterre, in International and European Law from Grenoble Alpes University and in International Relations and Business from the Institute of International Relations of Paris (ILERI). He has worked in 30 countries, including Brazil, where he worked for 10 years, notably for the State Government of Pernambuco as a development specialist. He worked for NGOs on the African continent as an expert in economic recovery in post-conflict zones. Today, he is the director of an international consulting firm specializing in social sciences and social engineering, with interventions in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali and Niger. Correspondent for France and Europe for the radio station CBN Recife. President of the Assembly of the IFSRA (Institute for Social Research in Africa). Social entrepreneur, speaker and mentor for the international organization MakeSense. Consultant in strategic intelligence and risk management for the business sector.