Russian energy geopolitics: the Druzhba oil pipeline

Eduardo Correia Leal Maranhão

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, since Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, the distribution and control over energy flows have been used as powerful tools of foreign policy by the Kremlin. Through their use, Russia has become a key trading partner for the European Union, which, until the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, was the main destination for exports of commodities such as natural gas and oil from Russia. With this European consumption, a relationship of energy dependence of the continent on Russia was created, especially in countries such as Germany, which became highly dependent on Russian energy to maintain its industrial capacity.

Thus, throughout the century, Russia has improved its distribution capacity while increasing its responsibility as a center of European energy supply. In doing so, Moscow has built a strong geopolitical weapon by maintaining for itself a role of high relevance in its relationship with Europe, which has become dependent on its supply, and by being able to use its energy capacity as a source of influence and external coercion, especially with countries close to its strategic surroundings in Eastern Europe, as previously demonstrated with Moldova and Ukraine.

CONTROL OVER ENERGY FLOWS

In addition to the commercial power obtained as a result of its position as a strategic exporter, Moscow has also acquired a new geopolitical instrument that has strengthened its power in Eurasia, namely its ability to control energy supply flows. This control stems from the various gas pipelines and oil pipelines built by Russia in recent years, which connect the distribution of gas from the Slavic country to various supply centers and energy-importing countries across the region. Pipelines such as “Nord Stream” and “TurkStream,” and oil pipelines such as “Druzhba,” exemplify Russia’s distribution power. They grant the Kremlin the ability to interfere in transnational energy flows that pass through its territory, enabling Moscow not only to generate dependence through its direct exports, but also to control external energy flows that transit through its territory.

THE IMPACT OF UKRAINE WAR

With the beginning of the conflict with Ukraine in February 2022, Russia became an intensified target of European sanctions, which had already existed since 2014 following the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, but increased after the start of the conflict in 2022. As a consequence, its distribution of commodities such as gas and oil suffered impacts on export levels. European fear of a potential Russian threat outweighed its need for energy supply from the Slavic country. The European Union turned to new methods and suppliers to meet its internal energy demand as a way to weaken Russia’s economic capacity, which also had to seek new partners for its exports.

Germany, for example, after interrupting its imports of Russian gas in 2022, which for years had been the country’s main energy source, found in Kazakhstan a new source of supply, initiating in 2023 a strong trade relationship in this sector with the Asian country, using pipelines for distribution.

THE CASE OF GERMANY

In recent days, Russia announced the interruption of the transit of Kazakh-origin oil through the Druzhba pipeline to Germany, starting on May 1st. Although the interruption is justified by “technical capacity limitations,” the action may be interpreted as retaliation for German support in drone development with Ukraine, and demonstrates the use of control over energy routes as a geopolitical instrument by Russia. The action may cause damage to the German economy, which has been facing difficulties since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, due to shortages in meeting the internal needs of its industries.

German supply through the pipeline occurs via the northern branch, which crosses Belarus, passes through Poland, and reaches Germany.

One of Germany’s main concerns is directed at the Schwedt Refinery, primarily responsible for Berlin’s industrial energy supply. Around 17% of the refinery’s demand depends on oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline. As a consequence, with the end of the flow, the unit’s operational capacity may decrease to less than 60%, which would reduce supply to Berlin.

Thus, the announcement of the end of supply forces Germany to seek new routes for oil delivery, such as ports in the regions of Gdansk and Rostock, in Poland. However, both alternative routes do not have the same capacity to meet Germany’s internal demand as the Druzhba pipeline. Estimates indicate an average flow of 150,000 barrels of oil per day through alternative routes to Germany, whereas through the Druzhba pipeline the flow was around 240,000 barrels per day, highlighting a new challenge for the German economy and its industries.

Thus, through control over oil flows, Russia demonstrates its geoeconomic capacity to generate consequences for a European economy, using this capacity as a tool to cause industrial and economic damage, as well as to influence and possibly coerce countries through its control over energy flows and routes.

DRUZHBA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INFLUENCE

In addition to enabling Russia to cause economic damage to Eurasian countries, Moscow’s control over energy routes allows it to influence other states in favor of its own interests, and even to coerce them into acting in line with the Kremlin’s goals. Cases such as Hungary exemplify this. In the Hungarian case, historically dependent on Russian energy, recent years have shown clear Russian influence over Budapest, particularly under the government of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. During his government, Hungary sought to strengthen ties with Russia in trade and nuclear energy cooperation, for example through the Paks II nuclear agreement, and agreements related to the renegotiation of contracts with Russia for natural gas imports.

As a result of this deepening relationship with Russia, Hungary increased its level of energy dependence on Moscow, maintaining high levels of oil imports even after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the imposition of European Union sanctions on Russia.

With the continuation of energy dependence, Moscow gained political leverage within its sphere of influence by maintaining an ally within Europe’s main international organization, which, at times, could act in alignment with Kremlin interests. This influence can be seen in Hungary’s stance on issues involving European Union support for Ukraine, both directly and indirectly.

An example of this stance appeared in Hungary’s recent blocking of a potential European Union loan to Kyiv during a summit in March. Part of this action was due to Hungary’s interest in continuing to receive Russian oil flows through the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, which crosses Ukraine toward Hungary and Slovakia. In January, oil transport was interrupted by Ukraine, which cited the need for repairs following alleged Russian attacks.

Although the loan of 90 billion to Ukraine was later approved by the European Union, after the withdrawal of the Hungarian veto, the case exemplifies Russia’s capacity to influence Hungary, which occurs primarily due to Budapest’s dependence on Russian energy and transport flows.

CONCLUSION

Thus, through control over oil flows, Russia demonstrates its geoeconomic capacity to generate consequences for a European economy, using this capacity as a tool to cause industrial and economic damage, as well as to influence and possibly coerce countries through its control over energy flows and routes.

The case of the Druzhba pipeline demonstrates both possibilities of impact that can be generated by Moscow, even in a moment of conflict and when European dependence on Russian energy exports no longer reflects the same levels as in the years prior to the conflict.

Therefore, through the examples presented, the pipeline demonstrates the high value attributed to geoeconomic power in the 21st century, as it allows a power to influence regional dynamics while also enabling its use as a geopolitical weapon, as an instrument of pressure or retaliation against another country.

REFERENCES:

GERÖ, Bence. Decades of Dependency: The Political Legacy of Hungary’s Energy Reliance on Russia. Vienna: Central European University, 2024.

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O Rebate. Russia interrupts oil flow via Druzhba and increases pressure on supply in Germany. Available at: https://orebate.com.br/mundo/russia-interrompe-fluxo-de-petroleo-via-druzhba-e-aumenta-pressao-sobre-abastecimento-na-alemanha/amp. Accessed on: May 3, 2026.

SULLIVAN, Arthur. Russia-Kazakhstan oil pipeline: energy crisis, Strait of Hormuz, Germany, Berlin. Deutsche Welle, April 22, 2026. Available at: https://amp.dw.com/en/russia-kazakhstan-oil-pipeline-energy-crisis-strait-of-hormuz-germany-berlin/a-76895743. Accessed on: May 3, 2026.

PÉCHY, Amanda. With Hungary’s blockade, EU summit ends without agreement on loan to Ukraine. Veja, March 19, 2026. Available at: https://veja.abril.com.br/mundo/com-bloqueio-da-hungria-cupula-da-ue-termina-sem-acordo-para-dar-emprestimo-a-ucrania/. Accessed on: May 3, 2026.

Eduardo Correia Leal Maranhão

Undergraduate student in International Relations at La Salle University (Rio de Janeiro), with a focus on foreign policy, geopolitics, and international security. He serves as a researcher on the Europe region at the Center for Strategic Assessment (NAC) of the Brazilian Naval War College and has completed a volunteer internship at the Brazilian Joint Center for Peace Operations, supporting the training of United Nations peacekeepers. He was awarded a bronze medal at the Brazilian Geopolitics Olympiad, organized by Seleta Educação, and achieved high-performance distinction at the Brazilian Odyssey of Diplomacy and International Relations, organized by Grupo Ubique Júnior.

Link LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/eduardo-correia-857851353