Saudi–Emirati Rivalry: A Strategic Fracture at the Heart of the Western Camp

Note: This article was conceived before the beginning of the attacks against Iran

Introduction

While international attention remains focused on the open conflicts of the Middle East—particularly the war in Gaza, the tensions between Israel and Iran, and the persistent instability in the Levant—a quieter structural transformation is underway in the regional system: the emergence of a strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

For decades, the two countries were perceived as complementary pillars of the pro-Western Sunni bloc in the Gulf. However, in recent years this relationship has gradually evolved from a strategic alliance into a discreet but growing geopolitical competition centered on the control of trade routes, strategic ports, and zones of political influence in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

This rivalry does not take the form of direct military confrontation. Instead, it manifests primarily through proxy conflicts, geoeconomic competition, and divergent strategies of power projection, particularly in Yemen, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa.

The phenomenon is embedded in a broader geopolitical context characterized by three structural dynamics: the reduction of direct U.S. military involvement in the region, the relative erosion of the Iran-led “axis of resistance,” and the growing strategic autonomy of the Gulf powers.

I. The Historical Foundations of the Saudi–Emirati Partnership

A Convergence Shaped by the Iranian Revolution

Strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi consolidated in the context of the profound regional transformation triggered by the Iranian Revolution. The emergence of a revolutionary Shiite regime in Tehran was perceived by the Gulf monarchies as an existential threat to the political stability of the region.

In response, six Arab states of the Arabian Peninsula created in 1981 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a mechanism for political, economic, and security coordination supported by the United States.

The primary objective was twofold:

• To guarantee the survival of the monarchical regimes

• To coordinate collective defense against the Iranian threat

Since then, military and political cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has become one of the pillars of the Gulf’s security architecture.

Strategic Convergence Between MBS and MBZ

The rapprochement between the two countries was reinforced during the 2010s through the personal relationship between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

During this period, Abu Dhabi played an important role in promoting a political model characterized by:

• centralization of power

• accelerated economic modernization

• repression of political Islamist movements

This convergence was clearly demonstrated in the joint military intervention in Yemen launched in 2015 against the Iranian-backed Houthi movement.

At that moment, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appeared as the pillars of a regional coalition logistically supported by the United States.

II. A Deeply Reconfigured Strategic Environment

The Reduction of U.S. Military Engagement

Since the late 2000s, U.S. foreign policy has shown a growing tendency to reduce direct military involvement in the Middle East.

This evolution became evident during the administrations of Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden.

Washington’s strategic priority gradually shifted toward systemic competition with China, leading to an increasing delegation of regional security responsibilities to local partners.

This shift produced a paradoxical effect: while it increases the strategic autonomy of regional powers, it also intensifies competition among them.

The Erosion of the “Axis of Resistance”

At the same time, the so-called “axis of resistance” led by Iran—which includes actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the regime of Bashar al-Assad—has experienced significant erosion over the past decade.

The Syrian civil war devastated the Syrian state, while militant organizations allied with Tehran suffered important military losses and face increasing economic and political pressure.

Although the axis remains relevant, its relative weakening has created a regional strategic vacuum, encouraging Gulf powers to expand their own spheres of influence.

III. From Cooperation to Strategic Competition

Two Diverging Visions of Regional Leadership

The transformation of the Saudi-Emirati relationship largely stems from structural differences between the two countries.

Saudi Arabia, a demographic and religious power at the center of the Sunni world, prioritizes a regional stabilization strategy designed to create favorable conditions for the implementation of its ambitious economic transformation program, Vision 2030.

The United Arab Emirates, by contrast, have developed a distinct strategy based on geoeconomic power projection. Abu Dhabi seeks to consolidate a network of port infrastructures, logistical zones, and military bases along the main maritime routes linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean.

This strategy is frequently described by analysts as a form of logistical thalassocracy.

Yemen as a Laboratory of Rivalry

This divergence became particularly visible in the Yemen conflict.

While Riyadh supports the Presidential Leadership Council representing the internationally recognized government, Abu Dhabi provides political and military support to the Southern Movement, a separatist force seeking to restore the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The southern part of the country concentrates most hydrocarbon reserves and controls strategic access to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, making it a crucial point in regional competition.

IV. Ports, Straits, and Maritime Routes

The Emirati Strategy in the Horn of Africa

The Emirati strategic projection also extends to the Horn of Africa, particularly Somaliland. The port company DP World has developed major logistical infrastructure in the port of Berbera. This project is part of a broader strategy of indirect control over maritime routes passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which roughly 10 to 12 percent of global maritime trade transits.

In response, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its relations with the federal government of Somalia, which opposes any recognition of Somaliland.

Sudan as a Theater of Proxy War

The civil war in Sudan has become another arena of indirect competition.

The Emirates are often accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, while Saudi Arabia maintains closer relations with the Sudanese Armed Forces. The country possesses roughly 800 kilometers of coastline on the Red Sea, including the strategic port of Port Sudan, essential for regional trade and access to the African interior.

V. Strategic Implications

Regional Political Fragmentation

Competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi tends to favor the fragmentation of fragile state spaces, encouraging the strengthening of local armed actors.

This dynamic increases the risks of resurgence of jihadist organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Growing Militarization of the Region

Uncertainty regarding the U.S. security commitment and the intensification of regional rivalries may lead to a new arms race in the Gulf.

In this context, the deepening of strategic relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—the only nuclear power in the Muslim world—is often interpreted as a possible mechanism of indirect deterrence.

Conclusion

The emerging rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates represents one of the most significant transformations of the Middle Eastern regional system over the past decade.

As the traditional antagonism between Iran and the Western bloc loses part of its strategic centrality, a new intra-allied competition is emerging over the control of ports, maritime routes, and zones of political influence.

This dynamic signals a broader evolution of the regional order: the transition from a system dominated by ideological and sectarian rivalries to one increasingly structured by geoeconomic power logics and imperial competition among middle powers.

The human and political consequences of this transformation are already visible in Yemen, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa—regions where the balance of power remains highly volatile.

A Brief Look Ahead…

Geopolitical Scenarios for 2030

Saudi-Emirati Rivalry and the Reconfiguration of the Middle East

Scenario 1 – Controlled Rivalry and Functional Division of Influence

In this scenario, competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates remains real but is managed pragmatically, without direct escalation. Both countries recognize that open confrontation would weaken the Gulf bloc and create strategic opportunities for external powers.

Saudi Arabia consolidates itself as the continental and political power of the Arab world, focusing on stabilizing the Levant and implementing its economic transformation strategy, Vision 2030. The Emirates, in turn, deepen their role as a logistical and maritime power, expanding port networks and zones of influence across the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Horn of Africa.

In this context, arenas of rivalry such as Yemen and Sudan remain fragmented but do not evolve into large-scale regional wars. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait becomes a space of limited economic and military competition but remains relatively stable.

This scenario would correspond to a form of stabilized regional multipolarity, in which Gulf powers assume greater strategic autonomy while the United States maintains the role of a distant arbiter.

Estimated probability: medium to high.

Scenario 2 – Escalation of Competition and Regional Fragmentation

In this second scenario, rivalry evolves into open competition for spheres of influence, transforming several local conflicts into full-scale proxy wars.

The division between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi deepens particularly in Yemen, where the Emirati-backed separatist south consolidates an autonomous political entity, while the north remains under Saudi and Iranian influence.

In Sudan, the civil war prolongs with external support to competing factions, worsening the fragmentation of the state. At the same time, port competition intensifies along the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, involving strategic territories such as Somaliland.

The absence of a strong stabilizing U.S. presence allows other external powers to expand their presence, particularly China and Russia.

The result would be a regionalization of global rivalries, with the Red Sea transforming into a strategic arena contested by multiple actors.

Estimated probability: medium.

Scenario 3 – Strategic Reconvergence of the Gulf

In this scenario, external shocks lead Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to rebuild a stronger strategic alliance.

A regional escalation involving Iran or a global energy crisis could push Gulf monarchies to reinforce military and political cooperation within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

This reconvergence would be accompanied by closer coordination of maritime security policies in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, as well as joint stabilization initiatives in Yemen and Sudan.

In this scenario, the Gulf would emerge as a more cohesive regional pole capable of acting collectively on issues of energy security, maritime trade, and international investment.

However, this reconvergence would likely not completely eliminate the structural competition between the two countries, which would continue to manifest itself in the economic and technological spheres.

Estimated probability: low to medium, but dependent on external geopolitical shocks.

Strategic Synthesis

By 2030, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may evolve in three main directions: controlled competition, regional escalation, or strategic reconvergence.

Among these scenarios, the most plausible is managed competition, characterized by geoeconomic rivalry and indirect influence in peripheral regions of the Middle Eastern system, particularly in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

This evolution suggests that the Middle Eastern regional system is gradually transforming into a multipolar space dominated by middle powers, where alliances are more fluid and competition is increasingly structured around trade routes, strategic ports, and logistical investments.

Marco Alves

Holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from Paris Nanterre University, a Master’s in International and European Law from Grenoble Alpes University, and a Master’s in International Relations and Business from the Institute of International Relations of Paris (ILERI).

He has worked in 30 countries, including Brazil, where he lived and worked for 10 years, notably for the Government of the State of Pernambuco as a development specialist.

He has also worked with NGOs across the African continent as a specialist in economic recovery in post-conflict zones.

He is currently director of an international consultancy specializing in social sciences and social engineering, with operations in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger.

He serves as a France and Europe correspondent for CBN Recife radio.

He is also President of the Assembly of the IFSRA (Institute for Social Research in Africa).

A social entrepreneur, speaker, and mentor with the international organization Make Sense, he also works as a consultant in strategic intelligence and risk management for the business sector.

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