The Karbala Narrative in the Twenty-First Century: The Political Significance of Ashura in the 2026 Conflicts in Lebanon and Iran

                                                                                                          Flávia Abud Luz  

The ceremonies of the Muharam month, sacred to Shiites around the world, gained in 2026 contours that transcend the traditional religious rite: in the cities south of Beirut, in the Bekaa Valley and in the main squares of Tehran, people dressed in black and chanting words of murmur did not march only to mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussein,  By walking among the rubble left by the most recent military campaigns that shook Lebanon and Iran in the first half of 2026, people demonstrated once again that Karbala's narrative has truly consolidated itself as the most visceral platform for political communication, psychosocial mobilization, and legitimization of armed resistance in the region.

In addition to mourning, the ritualistic performance of Ashura (the tenth day of the month Muharam) operates through the so-called Karbala Paradigm by constantly reupdating the foundational narrative where a numerically inferior force chooses sacrifice and death over submission to an oppressive tyrant. On the contemporary geopolitical chessboard, the rhetoric of Hezbollah and the Tehran regime carries out a direct transposition of this myth into immediate reality: the technological and military asymmetry of Western and Israeli forces is read through the lens of Caliph Yazid, while civilian resilience and commanders killed in recent attacks are elevated to the rank of martyrs of a modern Karbala.

The purpose of this text is to analyze howthe celebrations of the month Muharam can be an instrument of psychological deterrence and internal cohesion, that is, the ceremonial practices are not just rites of passive mourning, I explain. It is argued here that while Western analysts and/or policymakers measure the impact of conflicts for military power, infrastructure losses, or economic sanctions, the Axis of Resistance recalibrates conflict in the immaterial realm. By fusing the trauma of the recent war with sacred and historical suffering, Ashura transforms material vulnerability into a moral imperative of survival, demonstrating that the true center of gravity of this conflict lies in the inexhaustible capacity to confer political meaning on martyrdom. Thus, in the same way that Hussein would have given himself to martyrdom to reorient the Muslim community to its ideals of truth and justice, freeing it from the political corruption established by the caliphate of Yazid, still in the last decades of the seventh century.

By exploring the above dynamics, I seek to contribute to a critical reflection on the relations between war, power, and social mobilization in contemporary International Relations.

The Karbala narrative in the political, social and religious imaginary of Shiite communities 

In the year 680 AD, Husayn (grandson of the Prophet Muhammad) left Mecca for Kufa with a group of followers, accompanied by their families. His intention was to join forces with the local population against the government of Caliph Yazid and the Umayyad dynasty, seeking to lead the Muslim community back to a more authentic political and religious practice, linked to the teachings and experiences lived by the Prophet Muhammad and the other members of the initial community. However, Yazid's reaction was immediate; since using his power he ordered the governor Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad to occupy Kufa and suppress the protesters. Faced with impending violence and promises of financial reward, the city's community chiefs caved in to pressure and abandoned the alliance with Hussein.

Surrounded on the plain of Karbala by the troops of Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad, Hussein's small group faced pressure from Caliph Yazid, who was seeking an oath of allegiance to legitimize the Umayyad dynasty. According to classical Shiite historiography, the group was prevented from going to Kufa and had to set up camp in the desert. For nine days, Yazid's soldiers cut off the water supply from the Euphrates River, using thirst as a weapon to try to wrest a deal of political legitimation. Hussein, however, refused to budge. On the tenth day of the siege, after violent attacks, his comrades were killed and Hussein himself was brutally martyred and beheaded, and his head was sent to Damascus as a trophy for Yazid. The survivors, mostly women and children, underwent psychological torture before being released to return to Medina.

The martyrdom of Hussein and his companions, which took place in 680 AD on the plain of the Karbala desert (present-day Iraq), was an important turning point in Islamic history in the sense of designing the religious-political doctrine and Shiite identity, a fact that highlighted the differences, initially political – related to the succession crises of the Muslim Caliphate since the death of the Prophet Mohammed –,  between Sunnis and Shiites.

The Karbala Narrative historically served as a central source for the development of Shia symbols and rituals and that the central core of the narrative – which brings together basic elements of the narrative and actions of Hussein and his followers, with an emphasis on the moral qualities of the Imam (loyalty, courage, honor) and his willingness to be martyred – had a meaning considered universal and static when referring to ideals such as the pursuit of justice,  of truth and religiosity, but which presented the ability to mold itself, especially its symbols, to encompass the specificities of the social and political context in which its reading was made by clerics or leaders of movements who sought inspiration or even justifications for their political-religious actions (Aghaie, 2001).

As Momen (1985) argued, the apparent paradox between political passivity and the emphasis on suffering versus an activist attitude, which does not accept to submit to tyranny and decides to fight against such a force even if such action brings the certainty of martyrdom, in reality brought to the Shiites the possibility of a religious justification for an extraordinary political versatility,  That is, as both attitudes are equally desired and recommended, it was possible for those who wished to lead the Shiite masses to find inspiration and rationalization for their attitudes in both models.

The narrative of the events that took place in Karbala was instrumental in forging the self-image and collective consciousness of the Duodecimal Shiites (the "I") as an oppressed group that chooses to fight alongside God in pursuit of social justice. In this scenario, Yazid, the Umayyads, and the first three caliphs (the "other") were re-signified as symbols of tyranny, corruption by power, and forces opposed to good. 

Throughout history, the narrative has taken on a political tone and has become part of discourses of political, social and economic criticism, directed at external "enemies", such as imperialism or colonialism, and/or internal, materialized in the form of pressures against local leaders, rulers.

The use for political purposes of the symbols that make up the Karbala Narrative began in the period after Hussein's martyrdom, still in the ninth century, when the ritual of Ashura expanded in Iraq and began to be observed and recognized by leaders as a potential political tool that could be promoted or discouraged depending on their political goals and/or interests (Armstrong,  2009). 

In the more recent history of Iran, for example, Shah Reza Pahlavi forbade the reenactment of Hussein's martyrdom during Ashura commemorations because he considered them "primitive", an action that effectively contributed to the increase in the dissatisfaction of a large part of the Shiite population with the Shah.

Subsequently, the ritual of Ashura became a key element of the political mobilization of various parts of Iranian society and ended the Pahlavi dynasty, in a movement led by the Shiite cleric Ruhollah Khomeini (who exiled for 14 years in Iraq had contact with some of the clerics who would be responsible for the process of revival of Shiism, such as Sayyid M. H. Fadlallah,  which in Lebanon came to be seen as an important theological source and guide for movements that sought to organize Shiite communities around common demands).

In the Iran-Iraq War, the use of Karbala's narrative was also essential for the process of social and religious legitimacy of the combatants' actions, since the figure of Imam Hussein emerged at that time as an inspiration for Iranian volunteers and/or soldiers and their families, given that the emphasis was given to the courage of the Imam, and, in addition, there was a belief that he would be present on the battlefield to "assist the soldiers and provide them with spiritual support so that they can make their sacrifice".

Some of the battles were named Karbala 1, Karbala 2, and so on; here the relationship between those who went to the front (either sent by the Iranian army or volunteered) and the Lord of Martyrs (Sayyid al-Shuhada, Imam Hussein) was insistently presented by religious leaders as a way to achieve victory in yet another clash against oppression and tyranny, and throughout the Iran-Iraq War the latter was represented by the action of aggression initiated by Saddam Hussein's troops on Iranian territory.

Reconfiguring Martyrdom in the Twenty-First Century: Karbala's Logic in Iran and Lebanon in Recent Years

            Recent conflicts in Iran and Lebanon have demonstrated how the use of the narrative of martyrdom present in the history of Shi'ism remains current as a way of indicating that the leader's death is part of Islam's historic battle against injustice and oppression.

The first half of 2026 imposed significant pressures on the Tehran regime: economic suffocation (related to the new international economic sanctions), local demonstrations against the regime, and above all, the psychological impact of cyber and "surgical" attacks against its strategic structures and high-ranking leadership, both carried out by the US and allies in the Middle East.

The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in February 2026 demonstrated this fact, since in this context the "role" of oppressor fell to the United States and its most direct ally in the region, Israel, while the action of contestation against injustice and foreign interference in the country was in charge of Khamenei. Here the figures present in Karbala's narrative - Hussein and the Caliph Yazid - returned with their parallels for another clash and it is precisely at this intersection between politics and religion that the country's new government must try to seek some legitimacy. Another element that cannot be ignored in the equation in this context was the fact that the attacks that caused Khamenei's death occurred precisely in Ramadan, the holy month for Muslims.

The Ashura celebrations in July 2026, held in the cities of Tehran and Qom, have become a powerful tool of national cohesion and a catalyst for the momentum of neutralizing internal dissent and restoring state authority, considering the latent risk of social fracture of the Iranian government, something that made sense due to the acute crisis and material wear and tear related to the protracted conflict with the US.

Thus, by channeling the discontent and anxiety of the population into the liturgy of collective mourning, the Iranian regime operates a sociological transmutation: the frustrations arising from inflation and the feeling of military insecurity are resignified as the inevitable and honorable price of resisting an unjust siege, that is, in the middle of 2026 (and with the death of the supreme leader in February) giving in to the demands of the Western powers or retreating in the face of the military threats would be tantamount to pledging allegiance to Yazid. Hussein's historic refusal to bow down, even though he knew it would result in his physical annihilation, is used to legitimize Iran's refusal to cripple its strategic programs or its political influence through the network of regional alliances. And it is in this context that the Iranian leadership hopes that social cohesion will be reestablished.

In addition to all the symbolism that Ashura celebrations evoke annually for Iranian Shiites, this year's ceremonies were followed by another event of extreme importance: the funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and members of his family who were also victimized in the attacks carried out at the end of February 2026.

In Lebanon, Ashura ceremonies have gained significant relevance, especially since 2025, when they were held in Nabatiyya and surrounding areas amid the rubble of historic buildings that were destroyed by attacks by the Israel Defense Forces and, in addition, Shiite communities and neighborhoods related to Hezbollah in Beirut and surrounding areas also decided to take to the streets in memory of leader Hassan Nasrallah and the others killed in Israel's actions.

The 2025 ceremonies were not the first used by Hezbollah for social and political mobilization, I explain. The concepts of martyrdom and jihad, as interpreted by clerics who served as a kind of ideological inspiration for Hezbollah, such as Musa al-Sadr, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadllah, were appropriated by the newly created Shiite Islamic movement from the perspective of the rhetoric of resistance to aggression and external invasion (Israeli troops in South Lebanon), that is,  They were part of the discursive nucleus that united portions of the Lebanese Shiite community and its clerics around a political-religious movement whose "so-called resistance activities" were a non-negotiable priority according to its founding members.

From 1983 onwards, as presented by Kramer (1997) and Norton (2005), speeches by figures such as Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah who moved effectively between the historical past (mainly the Karbala Narrative) and the conflicts of the present, especially the perception of oppression and injustice resulting from the occupation of the South by the Israeli Defense Forces,  became common on Ashura.

In this way, the rituals of Ashura in Lebanon came to be observed by the Islamic party Hezbollah as ideal "vehicles" to propagate the party's objectives and identity with the population living in the southern region of Lebanon; the ideal of resistance – a fundamental part of the party's Lebanese and Islamic identity – was propagated through fiery speeches by the secretary general, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.  The narrative, in a tone of political criticism, aimed to mobilize the population (initially the Shiite communities immersed in a history of political marginalization) around the objective of resisting the interference of Israeli troops from the territory of southern Lebanon and, later, expelling them from that territory (Deeb, 2005; Norton, 2005).

Every land is Karbala and every day is Ashura.... The narrative continues

The Ashura celebrations in July 2026 make it clear that any attempt to understand the dynamics of the Middle East through a strictly materialistic (from the point of view of power) and Western lens is doomed to strategic miscalculation.

The ideological infrastructure that underpins the Axis of Resistance has not only survived recent U.S. and Israeli military campaigns, but has emerged symbolically reinvigorated. The urban devastation observed in Lebanon and the strategic suffocation imposed on Iran did not result in the political collapse expected by its adversaries; instead, they have been processed, digested, and resignified through an age-old liturgical language that transforms physical loss into moral triumph.

The analytical error of the Western powers lies in the misunderstanding that the political culture shaped by Karbala's narrative operates in long-term cycles, that is, in this sense an immediate setback is seen as a mere stage in a transcendental process of redemption and justice. By using such a narrative to translate the bombings and deprivations of 2026 (but also those that have occurred in the last two years), both Hezbollah in Beirut and the theocratic regime in Tehran have been able to channel collective frustrations and ensure social cohesion, I explain. The collective trauma resulting from the loss of life and the destruction of vital infrastructure was quickly nationalized and sacralized, converting civil discontent into an existential imperative of survival and rebellion in the face of new "Yazids".

The "instrumentalization" of Ashura in 2026 exposes the urgency of repositioning culture and identity as central, rather than peripheral, variables in discussions on theories of International Relations, that is, it is necessary to categorically reject reductionist analyses that, under the cloak of a Western-based rationalism, label the willingness to sacrifice and religious fervor in the Middle East as "irrationality" or mere fanaticism.

For actors shaped by political Shiism, such as Iran, Hezbollah, and Shiite communities in the Levant, the preservation of existential dignity and the refusal to submit — expressed in the Karbala Paradigm — constitute perfectly coherent strategic decisions and long-term survival logics. Ignoring this cultural grammar and insisting on predicting the behavior of entire nations only through economic incentives or military coercion is not only an analytical error of International Relations; It is the guarantee that global powers will continue to be blind to the true engines of resilience and resilience that shape the destiny of the region.

References

AGHAIE, Kamran Scot. The Karbala Narrative: Shi’i Political Discourse in Modern Iran in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Journal of Islamic Studies, v. 12, n. 2, p. 151-176, 2001.

ARMSTRONG, Karen. Em nome de Deus: o fundamentalismo no judaísmo, no cristianismo e no islamismo. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2009.

DEEB, Lara. Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, v. 25, n. 1, p. 122-137, 2005.

KRAMER, Martin. The Oracle of Hizbullah: Sayyid Muhammad Fadlallah. In: APPLEBY, R. Scoot (ed.). Spokesmen for the Despised: Funtamentalist Leaders in the Middle East. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. p. 83-110

MOMEN,Moojan. An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: the history and doctrines of twelver shi’ism. New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1985.

NORTON, Augustus Richard. Ritual, Blood and Shite Identity: Ashura in Nabatiyya, Lebanon. The Drama Review (TDR), v. 49, n. 4, p. 140-155, 2005.

Flávia Abud Luz

Professor of International Relations. PhD in Human and Social Sciences from UFABC. Master in Religious Sciences from Mackenzie Presbyterian University, Esp. in Politics and International Relations from FESPSP and Bachelor in International Relations from FAAP. Areas of interest: Postcolonial Theories, Gender Social Relations, Human Rights and Women's Movements, International Conflicts, Politics and Religion, especially topics related to the Middle East (Levant and Persian Gulf sub-areas); Lebanese domestic policy.  Author of the books "Islamic Feminism, Social Movements and the Reconstruction of Women's Rights in Morocco (Editora Appris, 2025)" and "The appropriation of the concepts of martyrdom and jihad by Hezbollah and the question of violence as resistance (Editora Appris, 2020)". She is currently developing research on the relations between gender, religion and International Relations. Member of the research groups Ylê-Educare: Education and Ethnic-Racial Issues (PPGE/Uninove); Gina - Research Group on Gender, Race and Intersectionalities; Right to Education, Human Rights and Public Policies (UNIAN/SP); Study and Research Group on Movements, Intersectionality and Educational Policies in Latin America - GEMINAL (Univas/MG). It is affiliated with the Brazilian Association of International Relations (ABRI).