Bolsonarism Has Already Won. The Second Round Will Only Determine How Far Its Victory Will Go and How Much Brazil Will Lose...

The first round of Brazil’s 2026 elections was closely followed by much of the world and left a bitter taste for many of those who still believe in the possibility of building a Brazil that is socially fairer, environmentally responsible, economically sovereign, and committed to expanding civil rights. It is true that the presidential election is not yet over and that the second round will determine whether the Planalto Palace remains in the hands of Lula or passes to Flávio Bolsonaro, but there is a political reality that can no longer be ignored by the progressive camp: regardless of the outcome of the presidential race, the Bolsonarist movement has already won a fundamental part of the 2026 elections.

The reason is simple, although its consequences are profound. The strength gained by the Bolsonarist movement in the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and the state governments, including victories in 13 states, has produced a balance of political forces that no president will be able to ignore. There is a widespread belief in Brazilian society that the president of the Republic possesses almost absolute powers, as if the occupant of the Planalto Palace were some kind of elected monarch, capable of determining the country’s economic, social, and institutional direction alone. The reality, of course, is very different: the president needs Congress, needs the Senate, needs to negotiate with governors, depends on parliamentary majorities to approve much of his agenda, and faces institutional, federal, and budgetary constraints that make the presidency only one piece of Brazil’s complex architecture of power.

For this reason, the most important question at this moment should not simply be whether Lula or Flávio Bolsonaro will win the second round, but who will have the real capacity to govern Brazil once the ballots have been counted. And, looking at the results of the first round, the answer is uncomfortable for the progressive camp: the Bolsonarist movement has built a structural position of power that may outlast the presidential election itself.

And this means that even if Lula manages to win the second round, the Brazil he will inherit will be politically very different from the country he found in 2023. If Flávio Bolsonaro wins, there will obviously be an even stronger convergence between the Presidency, Congress, the Senate, and the state governments, allowing many of the ideas defended by the Bolsonarist movement to move beyond electoral discourse and be transformed into public policies, legislation, budgetary priorities, and decisions of state, following Argentina’s “good example,” according to Flávio Bolsonaro’s economic leader.

But there is a question that should deeply concern the progressive camp: who really lost as a result of this outcome?

The environment lost, because a significant part of the new political balance of power is associated with a vision of development that frequently places economic expansion, territorial exploitation, and agribusiness interests above environmental preservation. Social programs lost, because income-transfer policies, social protection, and inequality-reduction measures now face a Congress much less willing to treat them as permanent instruments for building citizenship. Civil rights, gender equality, the rights of Indigenous peoples, minorities, and the LGBT population lost, not because all these achievements will necessarily disappear overnight, but because the political balance that should protect them has become much more hostile to their expansion and, in some cases, to the very preservation of rights already achieved.

A particular conception of national assets also lost ground, one according to which Brazil’s natural, mineral, energy, environmental, and technological resources should be managed through a strategy of national sovereignty and development, rather than simply treated as assets available to whoever possesses the greatest financial capacity or political influence.

But there is an even more uncomfortable question for us, as progressives, and perhaps it is precisely the question we should ask before simply blaming the electorate: why did such a significant portion of Brazilian society decide to vote for the Bolsonarist movement? Do they really understand what the return of Bolsonarism would mean?

For a long time, one of the most frequently used explanations was corruption. According to this narrative, voters shifted toward the far right because they were tired of scandals, the misuse of public resources, and the old political establishment, seeking candidates who represented a moral break with the traditional political system. The problem is that this explanation is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in light of Brazil’s electoral reality.

If the main motivation had truly been the fight against corruption, how can we explain the fact that candidates involved in allegations, investigations, and various controversies were elected or re-elected? How can we explain the political survival of candidates associated with the Banco Master scandal? How can we explain the election of politicians involved in allegations concerning corruption schemes, relationships with criminal factions or militias, and other practices incompatible with the discourse of moral regeneration that was used for so many years to mobilize conservative voters? And how can we explain that candidates investigated over issues related to sexual exploitation and children have managed to overcome allegations that, in any society that took the discourse of defending the family seriously, should have produced devastating political consequences?

Perhaps we need to acknowledge an uncomfortable conclusion: it was not the fight against corruption that elected the Bolsonarist movement.

Or, at the very least, it was not only that.

Nor does it seem convincing to say that the victory was the result of a strong preference for an economic project that was clearly absent from Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign. Where, after all, is the comprehensive economic plan capable of demonstrating how Brazil intends to increase productivity, rebuild its industrial base, expand technological capacity, reduce inequality, create quality jobs, and address the structural problems of public finances? Was what was presented to voters sufficiently consistent to justify such a profound change in the country’s economic direction, or are we witnessing an essentially ideological choice, driven more by rejection of the progressive camp than by the existence of a detailed economic program?

When Argentina is presented as a reference point for justifying certain economic choices, we should remember that a country with Brazil’s dimensions, productive structure, natural resources, and geopolitical position cannot simply import economic models as if choosing a franchise, particularly one that is failing so miserably, as the Argentine model... Brazil needs its own development strategy, and that strategy should take into account its industrial structure, domestic market, agricultural capacity, biodiversity, mineral resources, energy reserves, position in the South Atlantic, and its ability to operate simultaneously as an agricultural, industrial, technological, and environmental power.

So, if it was not primarily corruption and it was not necessarily the economy, we need to look at the interests supporting this new majority.

There is a segment of agribusiness that depends heavily on public policies, subsidized financing, infrastructure, rural credit, and mechanisms such as the Plano Safra, while at the same time frequently presenting itself politically against public policies aimed at the rest of society, as if the State were indispensable when financing its own interests but excessive when financing social policies. There is also a segment of political conservatism that demands freedom but appears to understand freedom as the right to impose its own moral conception of life upon other citizens, particularly when it comes to gender, sexuality, education, customs, and civil rights.

There is also a segment of religious conservatism that appears to have entered into a particularly profound contradiction with what it claims to defend. Religion, which should promote compassion, solidarity, the protection of life, and human dignity, is used by some sectors to justify wars, support discourses of violence, relativize the suffering of entire populations, and transform geopolitical conflicts into religious battles. How can an alleged Christian defense of life be reconciled with indifference toward the deaths of Palestinian children? How can the defense of the family be reconciled with the genocide or destruction of Indigenous communities? How can religious values be reconciled with the systematic use of fear, hatred, and the dehumanization of political opponents?

This is not about attacking religion or religious people, but about questioning the political instrumentalization of faith that turns spiritual beliefs into tools in the struggle for power.

And perhaps there is an even greater contradiction in the discourse of those who present themselves as nationalists.

While the United States, China, and the European Union are reorganizing their strategies to secure access to critical minerals, energy, technology, biodiversity, supply chains, and strategic resources, Brazil risks watching its wealth transformed into simple assets for international negotiation. Donald Trump wants to secure access to the critical minerals and strategic resources necessary for the future of the U.S. economy, while China is developing a long-term strategy to secure supply chains and technological dominance; Europe is seeking to reduce its external dependence and strengthen its strategic autonomy. The major powers have understood that natural resources, critical minerals, energy, and technology will be fundamental instruments of power in the twenty-first century.

And us?

We have sectors that present themselves as nationalists while, at the same time, appearing willing to hand over our strategic wealth in exchange for immediate gains.

Sovereignty is not a flag raised on a political stage. Sovereignty is the ability to decide over one’s own territory, one’s own resources, and one’s own future.

This is precisely why the contest between Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro should not be reduced to a war between left and right, nor to a competition between two political personalities. What is at stake is a model of the State, a particular conception of society, and, above all, a vision of the role Brazil intends to play in the world.

Lula can still win, but his chances are reduced in view of the scale of the challenge. He needs to win over a significant portion of voters who apparently remain indifferent or undecided about the concrete consequences of the choice they are about to make. And here there is an issue that the progressive camp needs to address intelligently, because simply calling these people ignorant, fascists, or irresponsible will not make them change their minds.

We need to say something much simpler: these people are voters, but they are also citizens, and citizens live with the consequences of their own political choices.

A voter who votes against environmental protection will not stop breathing polluted air because of that vote. A worker who supports reducing labor rights will not receive a special protection contract simply because they voted for the candidate who promised to make labor rules more flexible. A person who depends on the SUS will continue to depend on the SUS even if they voted against policies designed to strengthen the public healthcare system. A family that depends on social programs will continue to need those programs even if it voted against those who defend them. A small farmer will continue to need public credit, infrastructure, and agricultural policies even if they supported candidates who advocate reducing the presence of the State.

Politics does not end when we cast our vote.

Votes have consequences.

And perhaps that is precisely what the progressive camp needs to explain to voters once again, without arrogance and without paternalism: voting means assuming a share of responsibility for the country that will be built after the election.

If Lula wins, part of the hemorrhaging that could result from a potential Flávio Bolsonaro administration may be halted or, at the very least, slowed down. Lula could preserve social programs, protect environmental policies, defend civil rights, rebuild science and technology policies, strengthen Brazil’s international presence, and seek to preserve a strategy of sovereignty over natural resources and strategic sectors.

But Lula will not be able to do this alone.

And that is perhaps the greatest lesson of this first round.

The president of the Republic is not a king.

Lula would not be a king.

Flávio Bolsonaro would not be a king either.

No president governs alone because Brazil has Congress, the Senate, governors, state legislative assemblies, the Federal Supreme Court, oversight institutions, civil society, businesses, social movements, and an extremely complex federal structure.

Therefore, the second round will decide who occupies the presidency, but the first round has already decided something much larger: which political force will have a considerable share of the ability to determine how the Brazilian State operates in the coming years.

And that force is the Bolsonarist movement.

The progressive camp needs the courage to recognize this, because denying reality is the fastest way to lose it again. It is not enough to celebrate a potential victory for Lula while ignoring the composition of Congress, the Senate, and the state governments. It is not enough to defend social rights without understanding the economic interests competing for public resources. It is not enough to talk about democracy without understanding the culture war that is redefining the boundaries of public debate. It is not enough to defend national sovereignty while allowing our strategic wealth to be treated as commodities available to the highest bidder.

The issue is not only who will win the presidential election.

The issue is what kind of Brazil will be waiting for the next president when they arrive at the Planalto Palace.

If it is Lula, he will have to govern in the face of a much more conservative Congress, a much more conservative Senate, and a state-level power structure in which the Bolsonarist movement will have consolidated important positions.

If it is Flávio Bolsonaro, the scenario will be even more profound, because what for years was an opposition political movement may find the institutional conditions to transform its agenda into state policy.

For this reason, perhaps it is wrong to say that the second round will decide whether the Bolsonarist movement wins.

The Bolsonarist movement has already won.

The second round will only determine the extent of that victory.

And this is the reality that the progressive camp needs to understand before it is too late, because the real struggle will not end when Lula or Flávio Bolsonaro takes the stage to celebrate victory. It will begin the following day, when we discover who will actually have the power to decide about the environment, social programs, civil rights, gender equality, Indigenous populations, the LGBT population, national wealth, strategic resources, and, above all, the place Brazil will occupy in a world increasingly contested by the great powers.

The first round showed us that Brazil has changed.

Now we must decide whether the progressive camp will have the capacity to understand this change or whether it will continue debating the country it wishes it had while the real country is already being built by others.

Wesley Sá Teles Guerra is an expert in internationalization, international cooperation, and paradiplomacy, with a solid academic background from internationally renowned institutions. He is the founder of CERES – Centro de Estudos das Relações Internacionais (Center for International Relations Studies) in Brazil, and currently serves as the manager of the Triangular Cooperation Fund between Europe, Latin America, and Africa at the Ibero-American General Secretariat, based in Madrid.

Throughout his academic and professional career, he completed studies in International Negotiations at the Centre de Promoció Econòmica de Barcelona; in International Relations and Political Science at the Fundação Escola de Sociologia e Política de São Paulo; a Master’s Degree in Social Policies and Migrations at the Universidade da Coruña (UDC); an MBA in International Marketing at the Massachusetts Institute of Business; a Master’s Degree in Smart Cities at the Universitat Carlemany; a course in European Project and Fund Management at the Universidad Internacional de Andalucía (UNIA); and he is currently a PhD candidate in Sociology at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED).

He is the author of the works Cadernos de Paradiplomacia, Paradiplomacy Reviews, and Manual de sobrevivência das Relações Internacionais. He regularly participates in international forums on smart cities, global governance, and paradiplomacy, and has also been an invited commentator on CBN Recife. He was a finalist for the ABANCA Academic Research Award and is a member of international networks and platforms such as CEDEPEM, ECP, Smart Cities Council, and REPIT, maintaining an active involvement in international initiatives linked to cooperation, innovation, and governance.