Geopolitics: Potential U.S. Setback in Iran Represents a Risk for Cuba

Luis Augusto Medeiros Rutledge

Energy Geopolitics

As the conflict in the Middle East intensifies, pressure on the White House also grows to demonstrate strength and deliver concrete results on the international stage. In contexts of war or prolonged instability, governments tend to seek political, military, or diplomatic victories that reinforce their domestic position and external credibility.

The idea that U.S. difficulties in Iran could represent a risk for Cuba makes sense within a broader geopolitical reading, especially when considering the chain reaction of energy crises.

In this environment, President Donald Trump may redirect his attention to regions historically sensitive to U.S. foreign policy, such as Cuba. Due to its geographical proximity and its history of tensions with the United States—particularly since the Cuban Revolution—the island remains a strategic point of influence in the Western Hemisphere.

It is worth recalling that the Western region, especially Cuba, has recorded a consistent increase in investments from China in strategic sectors over the past decade. These investments have been concentrated mainly in infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, and port modernization, expanding China’s economic presence in the Caribbean. However, the current energy squeeze has caused all of this to collapse.

A potential strategic frustration for the United States in a direct or indirect confrontation with Iran would likely generate internal and external political pressure on the White House to restore its deterrence capacity and global leadership. In this context, Cuba could emerge as an alternative within a broader logic of geopolitical repositioning in the Western Hemisphere.

From a geopolitical perspective, some structural factors explain this possible shift. Cuba remains one of the few countries in the Americas outside Washington’s direct sphere of influence, carrying strong historical significance since the Cuban Missile Crisis. A more assertive action on the island would have an immediate impact on the perception of regional control by the United States.

Another important point is the need to reaffirm power after international wear and tear. A setback against Iran would undermine the image of U.S. military and diplomatic strength, opening space for strategic rivals. In this scenario, acting in Cuba—where operational and logistical costs are significantly lower—could be seen as a way to demonstrate rapid and effective action.

Perhaps the most sensitive factor for the U.S. president is the intensification of great power competition in Cuba. The growing presence of China and Russia on the island, through investments, technological cooperation, and potential strategic agreements, turns Cuba into a sensitive node on the global chessboard. A U.S. move could aim to contain or reverse this influence, preventing the consolidation of an adversarial hub close to the U.S. mainland.

There is also the component of energy security and strategic routes. The Caribbean is a relevant region for maritime flows, including energy and trade routes. In a scenario of instability in the Middle East, diversifying areas of indirect control over logistical corridors gains additional importance.

An important point that cannot be ignored is domestic politics. Governments under pressure tend to pursue external agendas that can be converted into internal political gains. A tougher stance toward Cuba has historically mobilized political sectors in the United States, especially in key states, reinforcing narratives of firmness against adversarial regimes.

However, this strategy carries significant risks. An escalation involving Cuba could reactivate Cold War–like confrontation dynamics, increase tensions with external powers, and generate regional instability, particularly in Latin America. Furthermore, the international political cost of an action perceived as interventionist could deepen U.S. diplomatic isolation, exacerbating precisely the problem it seeks to resolve.

Thus, a possible move against Cuba following a failure in the Middle East should not be understood as an isolated action, but rather as part of a broader attempt to rebalance power, restore credibility, and contain rival advances in an increasingly multipolar international system.

Drawing a parallel with recent U.S. actions in the Americas, the current U.S. administration—characterized by bellicism—views the recent experience in Venezuela as a positive precedent for increasing regional political control. The operation that resulted in the fall of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was presented by Washington as a demonstration of strength and rapid intervention capability, signaling that the United States still maintains decisive power in the hemisphere.

In this context, the strategic reading applied to Cuba involves an attempt to replicate, through different means, a similar outcome: the replacement of the current leadership. The alleged negotiations mentioned fit into a classic approach of combined pressure: sanctions, isolation, and indirect contacts with political and military elites.

The central target of this strategy would be President Miguel Díaz-Canel. The hypothesis raised by analysts is that Washington would seek to encourage an internal transition of power, avoiding the costs and risks of direct intervention.

Currently, the scenario of strong U.S. geopolitical influence translates into control over the energy and political sectors. Cuba has always been on the radar of the Trump administration, especially Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American. The path toward regime change in Cuba, within conservative political circles in the United States, was initiated in Caracas through three stages: cut off Venezuelan oil, accelerate the economic crisis, and bring an end to the Cuban regime.

The White House effectively blocked Havana from Venezuelan oil following Maduro’s capture, causing an energy and economic crisis on the island. Even the Kennedy administration’s quarantine at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 prevented Cuba from accessing essential imports and oil. The current blockade under the Trump administration goes even further.

Finally, Cuba is being economically pressured, diplomatically isolated, and openly threatened by a U.S. president who has already shown a willingness to pull the trigger. The blockade is tighter than anything seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The regime is weaker than it has been in decades.

Luis Augusto Medeiros Rutledge is a Petroleum Engineer and Energy Geopolitics Analyst. He holds an Executive MBA in Oil and Gas Economics from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and a postgraduate degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from IBMEC. He works as a researcher at UFRJ, serves as a Consulting Member of the Observatory of the Islamic World of Portugal, is a consultant for the Center for Foreign Trade Studies Foundation (FUNCEX), a columnist for the website Mente Mundo Relações Internacionais, and the author of numerous published articles on the energy sector.