Syria and the Challenges of the Energy Sector

Luis Augusto Medeiros Rutledge

Energy Geopolitics

When examining the development of Syria’s oil industry, it is essential to consider geopolitical factors, particularly given the country’s strategic location between the vast oil fields of Iraq and the Gulf countries. This geographical positioning grants Syria a potentially central role in the construction of transnational pipelines capable of transporting hydrocarbons to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, creating alternative export routes to European and Western markets.

The country’s geography allows such infrastructure to cross its territory, reducing logistical distances, transportation costs, and risks associated with instability in the energy supply chain along traditional maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Suez Canal. In this sense, Syria stands out not only as a producer—albeit a modest one in terms of reserves—but above all as a strategic energy corridor whose transit function, similar to Ukraine’s prior to the Russian invasion, enhances its geopolitical relevance within the regional energy system.

This centrality explains why control over Syrian territory and its energy routes has historically been a key element in regional and international disputes. Pipelines connecting the Middle East to the Mediterranean would transform Syria into a Eurasian energy hub, with direct impacts on European energy security, the regional balance of power, and the strategies of actors such as Russia, Iran, Turkey, the Gulf countries, and Western powers.

In light of the challenges facing Syria’s energy sector, the issue of sovereignty over natural resources is emerging as one of the country’s national dossiers with intertwined economic and political dimensions.

The recent official statement by the Syrian Ministry of Energy affirming that oil and natural gas constitute a national wealth and a sovereign right of the Syrian people reinforces the importance of restoring national administration over these resources as a fundamental pillar for supporting economic stability and ensuring citizens’ access to energy and basic services.

Currently, large areas of Syria’s oil- and gas-rich geography—accounting for nearly 70% of oil and gas production—remain outside state control. This starkly highlights the need for these resources to be returned to national administration in order to ensure that all Syrians benefit from them fairly.

However, Syria’s geopolitical reality hinders progress in national energy development. Southern Syria’s geography is being transformed into an undeclared arena of confrontation, where wars are no longer fought with cannons but with pipelines. The area stretching from Daraa to Quneitra and Sweida has become a vital center in the regional energy struggle following the convergence of major project lines: the Qatar–Turkey pipeline, which was revived in 2025, and Israel’s EastMed pipeline, which connects the Leviathan and Tamar fields to European markets. Those who control these corridors control not only the flow of gas but also the pace of political decision-making in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Following the European decision to end dependence on Russian gas by 2027, the Qatar–Turkey pipeline project has returned to the table as a more viable alternative to Israel’s EastMed project. Turkey and Qatar seek secure passage to Europe, while Israel views the pipeline as a direct threat to the profitability of its exports and its supremacy in the energy market.

The Leviathan field alone supplies Europe with more than 13 billion cubic meters per year, while Tamar adds additional volumes through the Eastern Mediterranean.

Any success of the Qatar–Turkey project would necessarily imply lower prices for Israeli gas and a decline in Tel Aviv’s position as one of Europe’s leading suppliers. Consequently, Israel views southern Syria not merely as a border area, but as a valve controlling its economic future.

In this undeclared war, Israel deliberately opts for indirect and asymmetric instruments, avoiding the direct use of conventional forces and prioritizing territorial control, surveillance, and the mediation of local actors.

From dominant positions in Jabal al-Sheikh (Mount Hermon) and the Rahba mountain range, Israel maintains a permanent capacity to monitor and preemptively interdict sensitive logistical flows—particularly the movement of trucks, heavy machinery, and equipment required for the excavation and installation of energy pipelines.

This control of altitude confers strategic superiority to detect, deter, and neutralize any physical advance associated with transnational infrastructure projects, transforming geography into an active instrument of geopolitical coercion. The logic is not open destruction, but silent obstruction.

In Sweida, this strategy materializes even more explicitly through the Druze National Guard, a semi-autonomous force. Dependent on direct Israeli funding, this formation imposes selective curfews, conducts arbitrary inspections, and exercises administrative control under the discourse of community security. In practice, it constitutes a political-logistical blockade mechanism aimed at interrupting any investment activity, technical reconnaissance, or operational preparation linked to the Qatar–Turkey energy corridor project.

This model of action allows Israel to plausibly deny direct involvement while maintaining effective veto power over adverse strategic initiatives. The result is the creation of an environment structurally hostile to energy investment, where regulatory uncertainty, fragmentation of local power, and indirect coercion replace open military confrontation.

Thus, the Syrian theater reveals a dynamic in which pipelines are fought before they exist, and where local militias, checkpoints, and administrative inspections function as geopolitical weapons integrated into a broader strategy of regional containment and preservation of the energy-strategic balance in the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Israel understands that control over energy is the new face of sovereignty. Its economy increasingly depends on gas exports, which are one of the pillars of its defense budget. Any alternative project, such as the Qatar–Turkey line, threatens not only revenues but also Israel’s status as a reliable supplier to the European Union. Accordingly, Israel is working to re-export liquefied gas and strengthen its long-term contracts with European companies to stabilize its market position.

The equation is simple: as long as southern Syria remains a turbulent and insecure region, few investments will be made in projects intended for the area. Thus, in Israel’s view, Syria’s division becomes a strategic line of defense that protects its dominance over gas corridors in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Luis Augusto Medeiros Rutledge is a Petroleum Engineer and Energy Geopolitics Analyst. He holds an Executive MBA in Oil and Gas Economics from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and a postgraduate degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from IBMEC. He works as a researcher at UFRJ, is a Consulting Member of the Portuguese Observatory of the Islamic World, a Consultant to the Center for Foreign Trade Studies Foundation (FUNCEX), a columnist for Mente Mundo Relações Internacionais, and the author of numerous published articles on the energy sector.