The Revaluation of Ground Operations in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: Attrition, Personnel, and Prospects for the Front

Eduardo Correia Leal

Introduction

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is going through, in 2026, a phase marked by the consolidation of a war of attrition, in which the ability to sustain military operations, replenish personnel, and exhaust the adversary’s resources has acquired increasing importance. Unlike the first months of the conflict, characterized by more mobile operations and attempts to rapidly seize important urban centers, the current dynamics present greater fragmentation of the battlefield, with the intensive use of drones, missiles, artillery, and smaller-scale ground operations.

In recent months, the intensification of air operations has come to play a relevant role in this dynamic. Russia and Ukraine have increased their use of drones and missiles against military, logistical, and strategic targets, while energy infrastructure, ports, and supply corridors have assumed a more evident role in the conduct of the conflict. For Moscow, these attacks represent an instrument for degrading Ukrainian military and logistical capabilities, imposing costs on Kyiv’s war effort and potentially creating more favorable conditions for its operations on the battlefield.

However, the Russian ground component has been making limited territorial gains despite the continuation of offensive operations, particularly in the Donetsk region. The concentration of forces in sectors such as Pokrovsk, Dobropillya, Kostiantynivka, and Lyman demonstrates the persistence of relevant territorial objectives, particularly around the so-called Fortress Belt. In this context, the availability of personnel becomes a fundamental variable for Russia’s ability to sustain and expand its ground operations. The search for new soldiers through domestic recruitment, foreign combatants, and the participation of North Korean troops may expand Moscow’s options in light of the current limitations on the front.

Given this scenario, this article seeks to analyze the possible intensification of Russian ground operations in the current context of the theater of operations of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, considering its relationship with the logic of the War of Attrition and the availability of personnel. The hypothesis is that the quantitative strengthening of Russian forces may increase their ability to pressure sectors considered priorities, such as the Fortress Belt, while simultaneously creating possibilities for intensification along other axes, such as the Kharkiv region. Thus, the expansion of ground operations could not only seek territorial gains but also contribute to dispersing Ukrainian forces and increasing the attrition of an adversary facing difficulties in replenishing personnel. The objective is not to assert the inevitability of a new major Russian offensive, but to analyze the strategic possibilities that the current circumstances may offer Moscow in the coming months.

The Intensification of the Air War in Recent Months

In recent months, the conflict has experienced a stage of military operations more focused on the air domain, with both sides carrying out mass attacks and bombardments using ballistic missiles and waves of drones against one another. According to data from the Russia Matters project, from March to July 2026, Russia has maintained more than 6,000 drone attacks per month, a figure that, since September 2022, had only been reached in July 2025. Regarding the use of ballistic missile attacks, according to data from United24 Media, since May, Russia has reached more than 85 ballistic missiles per month. In July 2026, for example, Russia reached its highest number of ballistic missiles launched, totaling 127, thus surpassing the mark of 121 missiles launched in February. These figures demonstrate a quantitative increase in the use of air attacks compared with earlier phases of the conflict.

According to the figures indicated by United24 Media, the number of ballistic missiles used by Moscow between May and July 2026 exceeds the total number of missiles used throughout 2024, which reached approximately 200 to 300 missiles that year, while 86 were used in May, 96 in June, and 127 in July of this year. A major reason for this increase in recent months is the high level of effectiveness that Russia has been achieving with its ballistic missiles in air attacks. From January to July of this year, according to figures from the Center For Strategic Studies, considering all missiles used by Russia, including ballistic and cruise missiles, Ukrainian interception has remained below a 30% success rate, critically low rates for air defense systems, with June being the only exception, with a 32% success rate.

This effectiveness is mainly due to Ukraine’s strong dependence on obtaining external support for the acquisition of air defense systems capable of intercepting large numbers of Russian ballistic missiles, such as the Iskander-M, the main model manufactured by Moscow. The Patriot missile system, manufactured by the United States, for example, has been a central part of Ukrainian air defense against ballistic projectiles in recent years, as it is one of the few systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. However, in recent months, American supplies to Ukraine have experienced a significant decrease, which consequently enabled greater effectiveness for Russian ballistic missiles, generating greater vulnerability in Ukrainian air defenses and creating greater room for attacks by Moscow.

In this context, Russian air attacks have demonstrated great complexity by mutually integrating large numbers of drone and ballistic missile attacks simultaneously. As a consequence, the air operational domain has been generating significant offensive value for the Russian military campaign.

On the Ukrainian side, the use of drone attacks has also demonstrated quantitative increases. In August, for example, between the 17th and 18th, according to the Russian Minister of Defense, approximately 1,600 Ukrainian drones were intercepted by Russian air defense systems, as well as 10 aerial bombs and two rockets from the HIMARS multiple launch rocket system, manufactured by the United States. Another notable aspect that demonstrates the increase in Ukraine’s use of drones is the growth of its domestic production. In 2025, for example, the Ukrainian army set a target of producing approximately 4.5 million drones, demonstrating the importance of the military use of the technology. In addition, their offensive operational use also recorded significant increases between 2024 and 2026. As a comparison, according to analyst Clément Molin, in August 2024, Ukraine launched approximately 1,000 drone attacks against Russia. In July 2025, this figure rose to 3,000 attacks. By March 2026, approximately 7,000 attacks had been launched by Kyiv.

Thus, although air attacks have held significant centrality in military operations throughout the conflict, in recent months quantitative and qualitative increases on both sides have been observed with greater intensity, due to the strengthening of the tactical value attributed to air warfare, particularly by the Russian side. At a point in the conflict in which Russia’s territorial gains have not demonstrated significant increases, from an offensive perspective, it can be understood that the air sector has gained greater centrality, as it allows Russia to inflict damage on strategic Ukrainian structures, such as energy networks, ports, and logistical corridors, hindering Kyiv’s war effort while simultaneously exerting pressure on it.

Consequently, the centrality of air power for both sides, but especially for Russia, has increased in value in recent months. Following a War of Attrition strategy, Moscow has been using air attacks to exhaust Ukrainian resources, cause damage to the economy and strategic sectors, and compromise logistical corridors. Through waves of attacks combining missiles and drones, Russia imposes a constant expenditure of resources on Kyiv, increasing the cost of its defense while exploiting its current air vulnerability. In this sense, in addition to the physical destruction of targets, the attacks also provide Russia with the ability to impose cumulative costs on the adversary, including on air defense systems, energy infrastructure, and logistical networks. At the same time, attacks against logistical points, such as the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdenne, in the Black Sea, have become more frequent, allowing Moscow to disrupt part of the commercial flow of Ukrainian exports through the region and increase economic pressure on Kyiv. Thus, air power is assuming a central function in the Russian strategy of attrition by combining the degradation of military capabilities with pressure on the economic and logistical sustainment of the Ukrainian war effort.

The Ground War in Recent Months

As previously discussed, in recent months, the ground operational domain of the conflict on the Russian side has presented few territorial gains for Moscow. According to data from the Institute for the Study of War, obtained through charts from the Russia Matters project, in recent months, since January 2026, the territorial advances of the Russian occupation have remained statistically around 45,000 square miles (a figure that has remained since October 2025), declining from the initial 45,762 in January to 45,666 in July.

Since June, a large part of the Russian operational effort has been primarily focused on the region known as the “Fortress Belt” of Donetsk, which corresponds to the main and final Ukrainian defensive line in the Donbas, incorporating major urban centers such as Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk. Since the beginning of the conflict, although it has conducted major military operations from the north and west toward Kyiv, for example, the main Russian occupation effort has been allocated to eastern Ukraine, particularly the Donbas region and coastal areas around Crimea, which justifies the emphasis on the region.

At the operational level, from the military perspective of Russian troops, successfully breaking through and conquering the Fortress Belt means expanding its control over the Donbas region, securing areas in Donetsk and other regions in the interior that have already been conquered, by making possible Ukrainian counterattacks and incursions into these territories more difficult. Currently, according to Deep State statistics, approximately 73.54% of Donetsk’s territorial extent is under Russian occupation. Therefore, control of the highlighted regions could increase this percentage, allowing Russia to attempt to bring the percentage of its control over Donetsk closer to the 99.62% of Luhansk, a province that, together with Donetsk, makes up the Donbas region. Furthermore, if they succeed in dominating the areas of the Fortress Belt, Russian troops may establish new control points, allowing them to expand their options for attacks and territorial penetration into other areas, such as southern Kharkiv, putting pressure on Ukraine while increasing their territorial gains.

The current military pressure on Kostiantynivka and advances in the areas of Pokrovsk and Dobropillya demonstrate the Russian operational focus on Donetsk. According to the ISW, Russian troops advanced approximately 46 square kilometers in the Pokrovsk operational sector and nearly 35 square kilometers in the Dobropillya area. These advances, although small, can be interpreted as part of a strategy to pressure Kostiantynivka, aiming to cut routes and force a Ukrainian withdrawal. In addition, military operations in Lyman also demonstrate the Russian operational plan to pressure points of the Fortress Belt through distinct positions. Russia has been intensifying attempts at ground penetration in Lyman, as well as the deployment of troops around it. According to the ISW, this may be part of preparations for a more powerful offensive in the region.

From Pokrovsk and Dobropillya, Russian troops may be able to pressure Kostiantynivka, which is already facing strong Russian military pressure. The advances achieved in both regions can be interpreted as part of the tactical side of the southern component of the operational plan to dominate the Fortress Belt, while attempts and operations in Lyman, for example, demonstrate the northern component of the plan, due to its proximity to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Thus, Russian military operations at these points can be interpreted as part of their effort to “dismantle” and occupy parts of the Fortress Belt.

Thus, regarding territorial gains in recent months, it can be analyzed that the Russian ground campaign has been facing a phase of culmination, a concept used in the field of Strategic Studies to refer to a situation in which military troops begin to experience difficulties in achieving greater territorial gains during a given stage of a military operation. However, when analyzing some of the main operational concentrations and battles in recent months, especially during the summer, it can be concluded that, although Russian forces have not been achieving major increases in occupied territory, their troops have been able to expand their efforts around Donetsk, as well as execute strategies that may contribute to an operational objective of increasing their control over the area, potentially contributing, in the event of success, to new military incursions into other regions.

New Soldiers and a Possible Intensification of Ground Operations

Given the context of the ground and air domains of the theater of operations in recent months, it becomes possible to analyze that Russia may intensify the conduct of ground operations and offensive incursions, aiming to increase its strength in combat areas where it has already been demonstrating efforts, such as in areas of Donetsk, but also possibly aiming to strengthen or open a new battlefront in another region.

Beyond the strategic domain, the deployment of North Korean soldiers by Pyongyang, combined with a possible intensification of Russia’s domestic recruitment process and recruitment of foreign mercenaries, may be a strong indicator that Moscow is likely to intensify its ground operations in the coming months, as well as use these means to strengthen its military forces.

According to Zelensky and Ukrainian intelligence sources, approximately 50,000 North Korean soldiers could be in Russia by November, to perform functions in the Russian regions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod, thereby freeing Russian troops to operate on the combat front in Ukraine, while Russia keeps its territories protected. Thus, Russia may add manpower to specific fronts while protecting its internal territories along the border with qualified and professionalized soldiers from Pyongyang.

Regarding a possible intensification of the domestic recruitment process, Ukrainian state sources such as the Main Directorate of Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine reported that Moscow is expected to prepare a mobilization of 600,000 additional soldiers in 2026 and 2027, with 300,000 this year and 300,000 during 2027. According to the aforementioned sources, Russia has expanded its eligibility criteria for military recruitment, now allowing for an extension of the call-up of people with criminal convictions, in addition to creating an electronic notification system that establishes restrictions on people registered for recruitment. As a result, Russia may increase its recruitment flow, enabling an expansion of manpower at a juncture in which the number of combat losses remains high, particularly in the so-called “death zones” of the battlefields.

Furthermore, the number of foreign mercenaries recruited by Moscow may be a notable point of growth in the coming months. Since the beginning of the conflict, according to the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), approximately 27,000 foreigners from various countries around the world have been recruited by Russia, demonstrating the use of an international recruitment network by Moscow. For this year, according to DIU sources, Russia plans to recruit approximately 18,500 foreign mercenaries to join its military forces. This target demonstrates a considerable increase compared with previous years and represents a way for Russia to continue expanding its contingent. In the coming months, this target could potentially increase if a situation arises in which Moscow needs to reinforce its number of soldiers for specific operations without causing heavy losses to its national contingent.

In this sense, the increase in the number of soldiers available to Russia in the coming months should favor an operational situation in which Russia is intensifying ground operations in different positions across the theater of operations. Furthermore, this increase could benefit Moscow by potentially pressuring Kyiv to also increase its contingent, at a time when the shortage of manpower has become a challenge for the Zelensky government. In 2025, for example, the average age of Ukrainian soldiers was estimated at approximately 45 years, highlighting the aging of a significant portion of the forces deployed on the front and leading Kyiv to adopt specific initiatives to attract younger combatants. In August 2026, the situation remained critical, with Ukrainian authorities acknowledging the existence of a significant shortage of personnel to sustain their military operations. In this context, difficulties in recruiting and replacing soldiers may amplify the effects of a War of Attrition strategy, as the need to distribute limited personnel among different sectors of the front reduces Ukraine’s ability to concentrate forces and respond simultaneously to multiple Russian pressures.

Why Intensify Ground Operations?

Given the current operational context of the conflict and its preceding months, the intensification of ground operations may possess strategic value that benefits Moscow. As previously mentioned, strengthening operations in locations that have been central to the theater of operations, such as the Fortress Belt of Donetsk and nearby regions, may generate strategic gains for Russia, such as securing the Donbas region and improving conditions for possible military operations in other regions. Thus, with the arrival of new reinforcements, Moscow could make use of additional and new soldiers to intensify its military pressure in the area, in locations such as Pokrovsk, Dobropillya, Kostiantynivka, Lyman, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk.

Securing the Donbas, as well as its positions to the east, is considered a Russian operational priority in the conflict. Thus, the intensification of ground operations can be identified as the principal means of achieving this objective, which has been the main focus of the theater of operations.

Furthermore, focusing on new battlefronts, whether by intensifying an existing one or opening a new one, may be beneficial to a strategy of resource attrition stemming from the War of Attrition promoted by Moscow. For example, if it decided to intensify its military campaign to the north, on fronts such as those north of Sumy and northeast of Kharkiv, Russia could force Ukraine to deploy troops to these points, which could consequently weaken defensive positions and reduce counteroffensive attacks. In August, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), Kharkiv was the second Ukrainian region with the highest number of clashes, behind only Donetsk. Much of the Russian effort in the area is concentrated primarily in the far north, near the Russian border. According to the ISW, Russian interest lies mainly in creating a buffer zone near its border that could make Ukrainian attacks against its territory more difficult, such as those directed toward Belgorod. In addition, the eastern part of the region has also been a theater of combat due to its geographic position near the Donbas, which makes it strategic for both sides, as it may enable defensive and offensive operations between them.

In this context, in the event of a tactical intensification on the Kharkiv fronts, Russia could force Ukraine to carry out a possible redeployment of troops and expenditure of resources, which could weaken its defenses and counteroffensives in other regions, favoring the Russian ground offensive in areas such as Donetsk, toward the Fortress Belt. At the same time, Russia could secure its objectives of moving Ukrainian troops away from the proximity of its border, preventing offensives, while also attempting to increase its territorial gains in Kharkiv, in the north and east, which are in closer proximity to the Donbas region.

Thus, an intensification of ground operations and offensives in the current context of the conflict could benefit Moscow by helping Russia strengthen its military pressure in areas considered operational priorities. This would occur in a theater of operations in which strategies stemming from the War of Attrition have been adopted by Russian forces to exhaust the Ukrainian war effort, which, in addition to technological supplies, has also been facing a shortage of soldiers for the front.

Therefore, at an operational stage of the conflict in which Moscow has been attempting to weaken Ukrainian defensive capabilities, and in which the territorial gains resulting from ground operations have not been increasing, the quantitative strengthening of its forces could make the intensification of ground operations on strategic fronts beneficial to Russia by improving its chances of succeeding in its strategic objectives, such as control of the Donbas.

Conclusion

Given the context presented, it can be observed that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is going through a phase in which the air dimension has acquired high operational value, particularly as an instrument for exhausting Ukrainian military, logistical, and economic capabilities. The increased use of drones and missiles, combined with attacks against strategic infrastructure and logistical corridors, has allowed Russia to increase pressure on Kyiv’s war effort despite the limited evolution of its territorial gains. However, the greater centrality of air assets does not mean the loss of relevance of ground operations. On the contrary, the difficulty of transforming the attrition produced by air attacks into sustainable territorial gains maintains ground power as an indispensable element for the achievement of Russian strategic objectives.

In this sense, the current dynamics of the ground front, particularly in the Donbas, demonstrate a possible revaluation of Russian ground operations. The concentration of efforts on the Fortress Belt, accompanied by operations in sectors such as Pokrovsk, Dobropillya, Kostiantynivka, and Lyman, indicates the continuation of the pursuit of territorial gains and the weakening of the main Ukrainian defensive lines. Although the advances recorded remain limited, the continuation of pressure in these sectors may create conditions for future operations of greater intensity. Thus, given the current phase of the conflict, air power may contribute to creating more favorable conditions for the actions of ground forces.

The ability to carry out this intensification, however, remains conditioned by the availability of personnel. Russia’s efforts to expand its contingent through domestic recruitment, foreign combatants, and North Korean participation demonstrate the growing importance of force generation for the continuation of its operations. The availability of new soldiers could allow Moscow to sustain greater pressure on sectors that are already priorities and, simultaneously, consider intensifying secondary axes. In this scenario, North Korean participation becomes relevant not only because of the number of military personnel involved, but also because of the possibility of freeing Russian personnel employed in the protection of border areas and other functions, expanding Moscow’s room for maneuver in its campaign in Ukraine.

This possibility is also directly related to the logic of the War of Attrition. The possible intensification of operations in regions such as Kharkiv could possess strategic value even without immediately resulting in major territorial gains. By forcing Ukraine to distribute troops, reserves, defense systems, and resources among different sectors, Moscow could make it more difficult to concentrate forces along the main axes of the Donbas. Thus, the opening or intensification of new axes would not necessarily need to have territorial conquest as its primary objective, and could also function as an instrument for dispersing Ukrainian forces, increasing the attrition of a Ukraine facing difficulties in replenishing personnel.

Therefore, the context analyzed suggests an evolution of the Russian ground war in the coming months, in which Russia appears to seek to increase its ability to generate and sustain sufficient forces to exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities. The expansion of the Russian contingent could create opportunities to intensify operations in the Fortress Belt or exert simultaneous pressure on other sectors. Thus, it cannot be stated that a new phase of major ground offensives is inevitable, but there are elements that make it possible to consider their intensification as a relevant strategic possibility for the Russian side.

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Eduardo Correia Leal Maranhão

Undergraduate student in International Relations at Universidade La Salle (RJ), with an interest in foreign policy, geopolitics, and international security. He works as a researcher on the European region at the Center for Situation Assessment (NAC) of the Naval War College and completed a voluntary internship at the Brazilian Joint Peace Operations Center, supporting UN peacekeeper training. He completed the extension course in International Security and Defense, offered by the Brazilian Superior War College (ESG), under Research Line 1: International Security and Geopolitics. He participates in an extension project focused on developing paradiplomacy agendas for the state of Rio de Janeiro. He was awarded a bronze medal at the Brazilian Geopolitics Olympiad, organized by Seleta Educação, and achieved high-performance results in the Brazilian Diplomacy and International Relations Odyssey, organized by Grupo Ubique Júnior

Link LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/eduardo-correia-857851353