The Lula Government and Brazil’s Return to the International Stage

Uriel Barroso

The return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the presidency of the Republic in 2023 represented not only an internal political shift but also an attempt to rebuild Brazil’s international insertion. After a period marked by diplomatic strain, environmental tensions, and the weakening of Brazilian multilateralism, the new government once again began advocating for a more active role in international debates on climate, development, global governance, and South–South cooperation.

More than merely restoring external prestige, Lula’s third-term foreign policy seeks to rebuild traditional instruments of Brazilian diplomacy in a far more complex international environment than that of the 2000s. Unlike the early twenty-first century, when there was greater room for the rise of emerging powers in a relatively stable context of globalization, today’s international system is marked by intensified rivalry between the United States and China, the strengthening of multipolarity, and increasing economic and geopolitical disputes. In this context, Cooper and Flemes (2013) observe that emerging powers have developed strategies aimed at expanding autonomy and international influence in a less Western-centered order.

Brazilian foreign policy during Lula’s first governments already reflected this logic. Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) define this period through the concept of “autonomy through diversification,” characterized by the expansion of diplomatic and economic relations with different international partners as a way to reduce historical dependencies and increase Brazil’s bargaining capacity. The rapprochement with China, India, Russia, African countries, and the Middle East formed part of a broader strategy to strengthen Brazil’s international presence.

At the same time, Brazilian diplomacy sought to consolidate regional leadership mechanisms. Saraiva (2010) highlights that Lula’s foreign policy aimed to strengthen South American institutions, especially MERCOSUR and UNASUR, with the goal of enhancing regional political coordination. Burges (2009), in turn, interprets this movement as an attempt by Brazil to exercise a “consensual hegemony,” based more on diplomatic consensus-building than on traditional forms of power imposition.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that Brazilian regional leadership was never fully stable. Even during the years of Brazil’s greatest international projection, regional resistance persisted due to economic asymmetries and concerns about Brazilian predominance in South America. This issue becomes even more evident in the contemporary context, characterized by regional political fragmentation and the difficulty of rebuilding effective South American integration mechanisms.

Another central element of Lula-era foreign policy was Brazil’s projection as a development power. Dauvergne and Farias (2012) argue that the country began to use international cooperation programs in areas such as agriculture, health, energy, and poverty reduction as instruments to expand its international political influence. In this context, South–South cooperation ceased to represent only diplomatic solidarity and also became a strategy of global insertion. Corrêa (2020), analyzing Brazil–Mozambique relations, shows how these initiatives sought to combine development, diplomacy, and international political strengthening.

Lula’s third term revives much of these guidelines, albeit in a significantly more competitive international context. Guimarães (2025) defines Brazil’s current foreign policy as a strategy of “autonomy through reconstruction,” marked by the simultaneous effort to rebuild the country’s international image, recover weakened diplomatic instruments, and reaffirm Brazil’s role in major multilateral forums. Faleiro (2025) reinforces this view, arguing that Lula 3.0 represents a policy of international reintegration after years of relative diplomatic isolation.

This reconstruction has been particularly evident in the environmental agenda. The Amazon has returned to the center of Brazilian foreign policy not only due to its ecological importance but also because of the geopolitical weight that climate issues now carry in trade, investment, and diplomatic legitimacy. Johnson (2001) already showed that Brazil occupies a strategic position in global climate negotiations precisely because it hosts a significant portion of the Amazon and essential environmental resources for global climate balance.

In recent years, however, rising deforestation and international criticism of Brazil’s environmental policies have significantly undermined the country’s external credibility. Rajão et al. (2020) show how part of Brazilian agribusiness has become internationally associated with illegal deforestation, directly affecting Brazil’s environmental image. Macedo (2021) goes further, arguing that the Amazon has shifted from a domestic issue to a matter of international climate security.

In this scenario, the Lula government has used the environmental agenda as a tool for diplomatic reconstruction. The reactivation of the Amazon Fund, commitments to combating deforestation, and preparations for COP30 demonstrate an attempt to reposition Brazil as a global environmental leader. However, there is also a persistent contradiction between Brazil’s environmental discourse and its economic dependence on agribusiness and commodity exports. Brazilian foreign policy seeks to simultaneously balance economic growth, environmental preservation, and international pressure—a task that remains one of the country’s main challenges.

At the same time, the strengthening of BRICS has become another key axis of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy. The group’s growth and recent expansion have reinforced debates on multipolarity, reform of international institutions, and the strengthening of the Global South. Sawal and Anjum (2023) argue that BRICS represents one of the main initiatives aimed at building a multipolar order less dependent on Western-led structures. Likewise, Olawore et al. (2025) note that the bloc’s strengthening reflects a gradual questioning of Western liberal hegemony.

However, although BRICS represents an important platform for political coordination among emerging powers, the group also faces significant limitations. Economic, political, and strategic differences among its members hinder the formation of fully convergent agendas. Moreover, there is a strong power asymmetry within the bloc, particularly regarding China, whose economic influence far exceeds that of other members. In this sense, Brazil’s participation in BRICS represents both an opportunity for diplomatic expansion and a challenge for maintaining strategic autonomy.

Relations with China illustrate this complexity well. Currently Brazil’s main trading partner, China occupies a central position in infrastructure, energy, trade, and technology. However, the deepening of this partnership also increases Brazil’s dependence on commodity exports and reinforces certain economic vulnerabilities. Steenhagen (2024) observes that Lula’s third-term foreign policy seeks precisely to balance engagement with the Global South and pragmatic relations with Western powers, without abandoning Brazil’s diplomatic tradition of autonomy.

At the same time, Brazil seeks to recover its historical capacity for multilateral engagement. Amorim (2010) argues that Brazilian foreign policy under Lula was characterized by active support for multilateralism, the valorization of presidential diplomacy, and efforts to democratize global governance structures. This logic reappears in the third term through Brazil’s participation in the G20, BRICS, the United Nations, and COP30.

However, Brazil’s return to the international stage does not occur under particularly favorable conditions. Vieira (2023) highlights that the Lula government faces a more fragmented world, marked by rising nationalism, armed conflicts, and geopolitical polarization. In addition, important domestic constraints persist, such as social inequality, economic limitations, and political instability—factors that directly influence Brazil’s capacity for international projection.

Thus, Brazil’s return to the international stage under Lula’s government does not represent merely a symbolic recovery of diplomatic prominence. It is a strategic attempt to reconstruct Brazil’s international insertion in light of transformations in the contemporary global order. By reviving agendas related to multilateralism, South–South cooperation, the climate agenda, and multipolarity, Brazil seeks to redefine its international role in an increasingly competitive, unstable, and fragmented system.

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Uriel Barroso

Specialist in International Relations, currently pursuing legal studies, with international academic experience in France. Works at the intersection of culture, trade, and diplomacy, focusing on multilingual strategies and intercultural negotiations. He has developed projects in mediation, arbitration, environmental issues, and academic integration, and also provides private tutoring with an emphasis on immersive and personalized methods. He has experience in geopolitical analysis, technical translation, and academic content production, as well as strong digital skills and team coordination. He has collaborated with institutions in multicultural environments across South America and Europe, bridging theory and practice with a critical and interdisciplinary approach. He has participated in academic and social initiatives focused on inclusion, education, and sustainable development. He combines technical and human skills with communicative excellence and strategic thinking.