Who Won the War? The Construction of a False American Narrative in the War Against Iran

Wesley S.T Guerra

More than forty times, President Donald Trump announced that a peace agreement between the United States and Iran was close. With each new statement, international markets reacted almost instantly. Oil prices surged or plummeted, stock markets fluctuated, and analysts tried to interpret what the next move of the White House would be. The final announcement ultimately came during Trump’s visit to the Palace of Versailles, taking advantage of his participation in a controversial G7 meeting in France. For Washington, it was the conclusion of a victorious war. But did the United States truly win?

The answer depends far less on the narrative constructed by the White House than on the concrete results observed after the conflict.

For Trump’s electorate, the war became yet another example of Donald Trump’s supposed ability to “resolve conflicts” without prolonged military interventions. The rhetoric was carefully crafted to project the image of a strong leader, capable of imposing his will on adversaries and restoring global peace. It is a politically efficient narrative, especially on the eve of midterm elections, when presidential popularity increasingly depends on public perception of success.

However, outside the domestic U.S. political environment, the perception is significantly different.

At the end of the conflict, Iran finds itself, in strategic terms, very close to the position it held before the war. The country had already shown willingness to negotiate limits on its nuclear program, while the Strait of Hormuz remained open to international navigation. The war did not substantially alter these two central elements.

On the contrary, the conflict produced unexpected effects.

The first was the practical demonstration of Iran’s capacity to control the Strait of Hormuz. Although navigation was restored, part of the region remains affected by naval mines and requires continuous international monitoring to ensure the safety of vessels. The episode highlighted that Iran remains capable of threatening one of the world’s most important energy routes whenever it deems necessary.

The second effect was political. Several Gulf countries observed that, despite the American military presence in the region, the protection offered by Washington has very clear limits. In a potential large-scale conflict, U.S. interests do not always coincide with the security needs of its allies. This perception tends to encourage more autonomous and diversified foreign policies among regional states.

Domestically, the Iranian regime also emerged less weakened than many analysts had predicted.

Before the war, economic sanctions and stagnation were slowly eroding the government’s legitimacy among part of the population. However, the death of the Ayatollah quickly became a national symbol. The culture of martyrdom, deeply rooted in Iranian religious and political tradition, strengthened nationalist sentiment and provided the regime with an unexpected recovery of legitimacy and renewal precisely at a time of increasing internal strain.

Paradoxically, the war may have given the Iranian government new political momentum.

On the international stage, American gains also appear limited. Washington managed to mobilize part of the international community around its strategy of containing Iran, but at the cost of increasing diplomatic tensions, deepening divisions among allies, and placing Israel in an increasingly radicalized position in global public opinion. The growing polarization around Israeli policy became one of the most significant indirect effects of the conflict.

Trump’s own narrative also deserves attention.

The president frequently claims to have ended nine wars throughout his political career. However, his foreign policy has been marked by successive international crises, threats to traditional allies, pressure to increase NATO members’ military spending, and a diplomacy based on economic coercion. While his supporters interpret these measures as demonstrations of strength, many international observers see the opposite: a growing instability of the international order built after the Cold War.

Meanwhile, Iran may gain access to new international financial mechanisms aimed at economic reconstruction. It is worth recalling that, during part of the first decade of this century, before the tightening of sanctions related to its nuclear program, the Iranian economy recorded growth rates between 4% and 7% per year. If some restrictions are effectively eased, Tehran may gradually recover its economic capacity.

Does this mean Iran won?

Not either.

The country suffered human losses, economic damage, and remains subject to severe limitations imposed by the international system. The war did not represent a classical military victory for either side. But it undoubtedly represented a renewal for Iran.

Perhaps the greatest winner was only the American imagination…

By proclaiming an absolute victory, Donald Trump seeks to offer the American voter a simple narrative: the United States defeated its adversary, restored peace, and reaffirmed its global leadership. However, international relations rarely follow such linear scripts.

History offers numerous examples of wars presented as great victories that, years later, revealed very different outcomes. The Vietnam War remains the most emblematic case, although Hollywood sells the image of an American victory; in fact, the United States never won the conflict. Even World War II, often used as the ultimate reference of American military triumph, was much more a victory of the Soviet communists—so much so that it produced geopolitical consequences far more complex than the mere defeat of the Axis powers, completely reshaping the international balance and ushering in decades of the Cold War.

In geopolitics, winning a war does not simply mean defeating the adversary militarily. It means achieving long-term strategic objectives.

From this perspective, it is still too early to claim that Washington has won. The events suggest precisely the opposite: the United States achieved an important narrative victory before part of its domestic public opinion—especially right-wing and far-right voters who are often reluctant to confront alternative information—while Iran preserved much of its strategic and political capacity.

Perhaps the greatest battle of this war never took place on the military field, but rather on the terrain of information. And, as so often in history, narratives may capture headlines; concrete outcomes, however, are far more difficult to manufacture.

Wesley Sá Teles Guerra is a specialist in internationalization, international cooperation, and paradiplomacy, with solid academic training in internationally recognized institutions. He is the founder of CERES – Center for International Relations Studies, in Brazil, and currently serves as manager of the Triangular Cooperation Fund between Europe, Latin America, and Africa at the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), based in Madrid.

Throughout his academic and professional trajectory, he studied at the Centre de Promoció Econòmica de Barcelona in International Negotiations; at the São Paulo School of Sociology and Politics Foundation (FESPSP) in International Relations and Political Science; at the University of A Coruña (UDC), where he completed a Master’s in Social Policy and Migration; at the Massachusetts Institute of Business, where he obtained an MBA in International Marketing; at Universitat Carlemany, where he completed a Master’s in Smart Cities; at the International University of Andalusia (UNIA) in Management of European Funds and Projects; and he is currently a PhD candidate in Sociology at the National University of Distance Education (UNED), Spain.

He is the author of the works Cadernos de Paradiplomacia, Paradiplomacy Reviews, and Manual de Sobrevivência das Relações Internacionais. He regularly participates in international forums on smart cities, global governance, and paradiplomacy, and has also served as a guest commentator for CBN Recife. He was a finalist for the ABANCA Academic Research Award and is part of international networks and platforms such as CEDEPEM, ECP, Smart Cities Council, and REPIT, maintaining active involvement in international initiatives focused on cooperation, innovation, and governance.