The Actions of a Worn-Out Empire: Donroe Doctrine for Latin America and the Associated Instability

Flávia Abud Luz

Throughout the Trump 2.0 administration, we have observed interesting phenomena that reminded me of some excerpts from Paul Kennedy's argument in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (year) in which the author discusses that in moments of relative power decline, a power would tend to seek a way of "reacting", that is, of expressing that it remains relevant to international relations and politics from grandiose acts of security reinforcement (considering the dynamics of self-help in an anarchic international system). Thus, we can think that in a context like the current one in which the United States has lost ground to powers such as China, it is interesting to observe that the former seems to assume the posture described by Kennedy by spending more on security, an aspect that makes the rational choice of resource allocation turn to elements focused on material power,  that is, warlike.

The so-called Donroe Doctrine, established with the reappointment of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2024, set aside a posture based on caution and a certain distance from the internal politics of the countries of the Latin American region and began to act based on the so-called principle of exceptionalism, an element previously observed in U.S. foreign policy in the context of the Monroe Doctrine (formalized in 1823),  for example, in which in its initial context it aimed to prevent the action of Spain and other European powers in the Western Hemisphere. Over the decades, the doctrine was revisited, perhaps having its peak from the actions of President Theodore Roosevelt, who under the policy of the "Big Stick" began to use the pretext of protecting the security of America (as a continent) to carry out political and military interventions in Latin American and Caribbean countries.

The main objective of this article is to analyze, albeit briefly, the recent actions of the United States in Latin America, considering its short and medium-term impacts on issues that are already complex for the region, such as discussions around the concept of sovereignty, internal political stability, border security, and transactional crimes. The hypothesis discussed here is that such actions (or even speeches, as in the case of the support for Rodrigo Paz in Bolivia) can be interpreted as a desperate way for the US to avoid contesting the status quo by powers such as China. Thus, the worn-out U.S. empire is making great strides in an onslaught to secure local political "loyalties," secure natural resources, and at the same time try to keep the region under its influence.

Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean

The principle of exceptionalism, based on the idea that the U.S. (because of its values of freedom and democracy) has a leadership mission in the world, is one of the pillars of U.S. foreign policy. Exceptionalism had great political weight in the nineteenth century and a popular form of it was widely spread from the philosophy of Manifest Destiny, a kind of popular belief of an almost messianic nature that the American people would be "guided by God" to expand their territory throughout the American continent, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

More than a philosophy, Manifest Destiny mobilized actions in the internal and external fields, that is, in the domestic and foreign policy of the United States throughout the nineteenth century. became the target of occupation, as well as in relation to the natural resources present in them and which, when discovered, were exploited in an unsustainable way.

In the external context, it is possible to highlight the initially peaceful movement of acquisition of territories by the United States based on negotiations and financial agreements with European powers in the region, as was the case of France, Spain and Russia, countries from which the territories of Louisiana were acquired through economic compensation, respectively,  of California and Alaska.

In addition, the expansion brought to light relevant processes for North American territorial consolidation, such as the Mexican-American War (between 1846 and 1848) in which Mexico and the United States presented very particular views on the territorial limits of Texas (considering that the territory also encompassed Colorado, New Mexico) and sought to justify their presence and control of the region. 

With regard to action in Latin America, it is possible to highlight the Monroe Doctrine (formalized in 1823), for example, which in its initial context aimed to prevent the action of Spain and other European powers in the Western Hemisphere. Over the decades, the doctrine was revisited, perhaps having its peak from the actions of President Theodore Roosevelt, who under the policy of the "Big Stick" began to use the pretext of "protecting the security of America" (as a continent) to carry out political and military interventions in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Thus, it is possible to observe that the doctrine developed a double moral standard of action that, while it wanted to "prevent" the projection of power by European countries in the region, did not hesitate to transform it into a kind of geopolitical chessboard of its own. 

Between the 1960s and 1980s, the rhetoric of democratic values that guided American exceptionalism, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, fell apart. In the context of the Cold War, the abstract defense of "democracy" was replaced by a logic that aimed to prioritize the containment of communism, under the aegis of the National Security Doctrine (DSN). Unlike traditional military theories, which tended to see the figure of the enemy in the form of an external force trying to invade the borders of the state, the DSN real danger would be within the territory, that is, under the logic of the Cold War, any form of action understood as political dissent (such as a social movement, union, student group or intellectual) was labeled as "subversive". Thus, the new logic of enmity began to have the citizen himself who questioned the established order as the main target.

The DSN shaped U.S. foreign policy for South America by training the armed forces of several countries in the region from the School of the Americas, by promoting the fight against the "internal enemy" (political dissidents, social movements, and guerrillas) and U.S. intelligence was also colluding with the network of transnational clandestine repression that resulted in several executions.  torture and disappearances.

Donald Trump's return to the White House consolidated a profound mutation in the use of exceptionalism: the traditional rhetoric of "exporting democracy" and acting as the "leadership of the free world" was largely abandoned in favor of a rigid nationalism, synthesized in the slogan "America First" and made official in the National Security Strategy based on three central elements.

First, Trump's work in the region is no longer guided by economic development or humanitarian aid (with drastic cuts in USAID's budget), something observed in previous administrations. Instead, Trump focused on the discussion of U.S. domestic security. Under the justification of fighting drug trafficking and organized crime, the administration began to act aggressively and unilaterally, exemplified by the intensification of Operation Southern Spear in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific, which resorts to naval blockades and shows of force.

Second, the development of economic suffocation and isolation measures against countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, an action that was in line with direct and unilateral actions in the Caribbean routes, as well as the total blockade of sanctioned oil tankers.

And the third element manifested itself in the establishment of ideological alliances with right-wing aligned governments in the region, making the US a priority partner (in an attempt to isolate China's action in the region) from the commercial conditioning to absolute cooperation in containing migratory flows.

Discourse and attempt to contain popular demonstrations in Bolivia

            The recent U.S. strategy for Bolivia focuses on three major interconnected axes: the global race for mineral resources, the containment of extra-regional rivals, and ideological realignment in South America. Such a strategic design can be considered because of a central change in Bolivia: the electoral defeat of the MAS (Movement Toward Socialism) party in the presidential election held in the second half of 2025 and the subsequent inauguration of Rodrigo Paz, who in his first actions as president has already resumed diplomatic channels between La Paz and Washington that had been inoperative for years.

            From a pragmatic point of view, the most relevant axis of the US strategy seems to be the race for mineral resources, considering that Bolivia has the largest known lithium reserves in the world (Ledebur and Weinthal, 2025) and it is precisely the magnitude of this stock that attracts the predatory interest of transnational corporations and foreign powers in the race for decarbonization.

Despite holding this massive stockpile concentrated in the Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia faces immense socioeconomic and technological challenges to transform it into effective production. Since 2010, the country has adopted a state-led extraction strategy (through the state-owned Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos - YLB), but in recent years it has begun to sign complex contracts with foreign investors to try to make the industrialization of this stock viable. This change in action by the Bolivian government has transformed the region into a high-risk laboratory for indigenous rights, as geopolitical pressure and global predatory interest in accessing the immense amount of critical minerals has trampled on local prior consultation processes, that is, the rights of local indigenous communities have been disrespected.

            Under the leadership of Donald Trump and the government of Rodrigo Paz, negotiations were signed to build technological cooperation agreements that would expand the U.S. presence as an important player in Bolivia, especially due to the promise of financial and technological investments to boost Bolivian production, which has historically lagged far behind neighbors such as Chile and Argentina.

            The second axis of the Trump administration's actions in Bolivia is directly related to the first and in short, it aims to ensure the containment of extra-regional rivals, that is, to contain the action of actors such as China and Russia, since over the decades of government led by the MAS (Movement to Socialism) party, these countries have approached Bolivia in negotiations related to the direct extraction of lithium. The rapprochement led to the signing of consortiums with Chinese (such as CBC) and Russian (Uranium One) state-owned companies.

            Considering the U.S. geopolitical objectives in the South American region, Washington's current geopolitical interest is to use the new center-right government in La Paz to weaken or revise the aforementioned contracts, limiting the presence of Chinese and Russian technology and capital in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure on the continent.

            The last axis of action, the ideological realignment in South America, is related to the perception of the U.S. government that the political orientation of Bolivia directly affects the regional balance of power. La Paz's rapprochement with Washington would thus serve to strengthen a bloc of governments aligned with the liberal-conservative and pragmatic spectrum in the region, complementing the dialogue that the U.S. maintains with other right-wing and center-right governments in South America, such as Argentina under the leadership of Javier Milei.

            This "political-ideological realignment" generated a strong reaction from Bolivian civil society: the government of Rodrigo Paz began to face an intense wave of protests, strikes and social rebellions led by indigenous movements, miners and unions linked to the MAS and Evo Morales, which contest the privatization agendas and the strong inflation. And recently, on June 20, 2026[1], after about 50 days of protests and social upheaval, Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz declared a state of emergency, a measure that gave the president constitutional powers to "restore order," such as sending armed forces to ensure the liberation of areas and roads that are experiencing blockades. 

The interest of the U.S., therefore, also lies in monitoring and trying to ensure the stability of the allied government in the face of the risk of social upheaval, since the actions of the demonstrators were even described in a recent demonstration by the U.S. government as a "threat to security and democracy" in Bolivia.

The Eagle's Claws Reach Northern Brazil: The White House's Recent Classification of the CV and PCC as Terrorists

The recent classification of the criminal organizations Comando Vermelho (CV) and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) as terrorists by the U.S. government reinforces the Trump administration's interference in the Pan-Amazon region, especially by justifying such action as part of the "commitment" of that administration in relation to confronting criminal organizations that operate at different vertices of transnational crimes.  but above all in drug trafficking. To better understand the latest facts, it is important to analyze all the elements that make up the conjuncture.

First, the decision taken by the White House in the last week of May 2026 has an important factor linked to the possible development of unilateral actions by the US to "neutralize threats" to its security, that is, we would be facing the formation of a discourse, moved by the US, which aims to securitize an issue (in this case it would theoretically be the fight against drug trafficking and related transnational crimes in the Pan-Amazon region) and thus ensure that any action taken to intercept aircraft, boats coming from Brazil in international airspace or seaspace.

Second, and directly linked to the previous topic, is the dangerous precedent of such interceptions or "minor" interventions opening space for a kind of "tutelage" of Brazilian territory, challenging its sovereignty to deal with the issue of violence and crimes related to the actions of criminal organizations (CV and PCC) in the country. What can be discussed here is precisely the questioning of Brazilian territorial sovereignty, that is, the fact that an external actor (the USA) can interfere in aspects of population management and violence that constitute a central aspect of state sovereignty and that guided the development of modern states.

Thus, the already questioned idea of shared sovereignty resurfaces, based on the possibility of cooperation between States on a given theme, making the notion of more restricted sovereignty more flexible. Such a discussion also ignites reflection on what would be the erosion of state sovereignty, considering that in some territories that are controlled by criminal organizations, the state itself has difficulties in acting and exercising its power, either through the application of laws or even through public policies or basic services (sanitation, security).

The way in which the White House acted in classifying the CV and the PCC generated, to a certain extent, noise and obstacles in the bilateral relations between both countries, especially if we observe that the Brazilian and U.S. governments had just under two months ago signed an international cooperation through the MIT Project (Mutual Interdiction Team),  made official on the Brazilian government's website on April 10, 2026, in which the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service and the U.S. border agency had committed to exchanging intelligence information to intercept illicit shipments of money and weapons. The initiative was the result of a rapprochement between the U.S. and Brazil in January 2026, when both countries discussed the possibility of more effective actions between them to deal with the various fronts of criminal action, especially in the Triple Border. However, the recent unilateral U.S. action makes invisible a joint initiative that seemed promising and at the same time weakens the Brazilian government, which is now being asked to develop more energetic measures to deal with regional security (thinking about a cut of the Pan-Amazon, for example) and to confront the various criminal actions carried out by factions that operate in the national territory.

It is also important to note that the Anti-Terrorism Law in Brazil is currently restricted in its definition of terrorism, since it only frames as such violent practices or acts that are motivated by elements such as xenophobia and discrimination (based on color, race, ethnicity or religion) and that have the intention of generating a certain social disorder. Thus, criminal organizations such as CV and PCC are not classified as terrorists by the Brazilian State, especially considering that the financial motivation (profits from drug trafficking, weapons and other financial crimes, such as money laundering and real estate speculation) is the main element that still keeps them in the "category" of criminal faction.

On June 2, 2026, deputies filed bills in the Chamber of Deputies that aim to change the way Brazil deals with the issue of criminal factions and their activities. The emergence of such projects reinforces a perception that the Brazilian government will also suffer internal pressure with regard to this issue. Among the bills presented are the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law (of 2016), considering a change in the current definition of terrorism; while another project deals with the discussion of the Migration Law (of 2017), considering the possible implications of restricting entry for people who have any type of proven link with criminal organizations.

Considering the conjuncture and the existence of the MIT Project (Mutual Interdiction Team), it is also possible to point out that the only possible point of cooperation between the US and Brazil would be the action to contain the flow of money taken from the country to tax havens, that is, the financial asphyxiation of the currently classified criminal factions would be a point of convergence.

From the latest developments, we can think about the most direct economic, military, and logistical-operational impacts for Brazil, especially for the states of the northern region, I explain. Considering that the region is a crucial point in the logistics of the Pan-Amazon and, in the case of Amazonas, it is a direct neighbor of the largest drug producers in the region (Peru and Colombia), it is possible that the recent action of the White House will bring, in the economic-logistical aspect, companies operating in the sectors of river transport, aviation, fuel trade and some agricultural inputs to have to deal with more intense inspection,  that is, stricter audit/compliance measures, since from the White House's definition of terrorism, the mere involvement with activities linked to the CV and PCC organizations, even through extortion or coercion, can cause people and companies to be "framed" as agents that finance terrorist activities.

With regard to the military aspect, it is possible to highlight that in order to face the accusations of inability to protect its borders, the Brazilian government seeks to intensify actions in such areas, especially in the Triple Border, which should generate an increase in the military contingent and in the budget allocated to defense. Thus, greater actions would be expected in the channels of the Solimões, Negro and Japurá rivers. And finally, still on the military and economic topic, we can think of the increased pressure from border cities (such as Tabatinga-Leticia-Santa Rosa) for possible counterterrorism operations on the borders, an aspect that can increase violence and logistical costs in the region.

The actions of a worn-out Empire

Throughout this article, I have sought to analyze, even if briefly, the recent U.S. performance in Latin America, considering its short and medium-term impacts on issues that are already complex for the region, such as discussions around the concept of sovereignty, internal political stability, border security, and transactional crimes.

The hypothesis discussed here is confirmed from the moment we observe the desperate posture of the US to avoid the challenge of the status quo in the South American region by powers such as China and at the same time guarantee access to critical minerals, as is the case of the action in Bolivia. In the case of Brazil, the U.S. insistence on interfering in local processes, in this case bringing up the issue of qualifying criminal factions as terrorists, represents the U.S. interest in guaranteeing access to the Amazon and establishing governments of loyalty in South America. Thus, the worn-out U.S. empire is making great strides in an onslaught to guarantee local political "loyalties", guarantee natural resources and at the same time try to keep the region under its influence that paradoxically represents the questioning of its power in the region.

Referências

HAESBAERT, Rogério; BÁRBARA, Marcelo de Jesus. Da Doutrina Monroe à “Doutrina Donroe”: breve análise da territorialização geopolítica colonial-imperial dos estados unidos no “hemisfério ocidental”. GEOgraphia, Niterói, v. 28, n. 60, 2026.

LEDEBUR, Kathryn; WEINTHAL, Erika. Critical minerals governance in Bolivia: Prior consultation, rights, and international standards. Environment and Security, [s. l.], v. 2, nov. 2025.

[1] https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2026/06/20/presidente-da-bolivia-decreta-estado-de-emergencia-apos-50-dias-de-protestos.ghtml

Flávia Abud Luz

Professor of International Relations. Holds a PhD in Human and Social Sciences from UFABC. Master’s degree in Religious Studies from Mackenzie Presbyterian University. Specialization in Politics and International Relations from FESPSP, and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from FAAP.

Research interests: Postcolonial theories, gender social relations, human rights and women’s movements, international conflicts, politics and religion, especially topics related to the Middle East (Levant and Persian Gulf subregions), and Lebanese domestic politics.

Author of the books “Islamic Feminism, Social Movements and the Reconstruction of Women’s Rights in Morocco” (Appris Publishing, 2025) and “The appropriation of the concepts of martyrdom and jihad by Hezbollah and the issue of violence as resistance” (Appris Publishing, 2020). Currently conducting research on the relationship between gender, religion, and International Relations.

Member of the research groups Ylê-Educare: Education and Ethno-Racial Issues (PPGE/Uninove); Gina – Research Group on Gender, Race and Intersectionality; Right to Education, Human Rights and Public Policies (UNIAN/SP); and the Study and Research Group on Movements, Intersectionality and Educational Policies in Latin America – GEMINAL (Univas/MG).

Member of the Brazilian International Relations Association (ABRI).